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On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer 
Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent 
Client 
Paul R. Tremblay* 
The increasing recognition that the attorney-client relation-
ship is governed by considerations of informed consentl inevitably 
creates considerable uncertainty for attorneys representing clients 
whose competence is in question. The ideology of informed consent 
asserts that lawyers may act only, or primarily, on the direction of 
their clients. Lawyers serve, in this fundamental sense, as agents of 
their clients. The supposition that lawyers know what is best for 
their clients is no longer as accepted as it may have been in the 
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; J.D. 1978, UCLA; 
B.A. 1973, Boston College. A somewhat different version of this Article was presented at the 
UCLA-University of Warwick International Clinical Conference in Los Angeles, California, 
in October, 1986. I wish to thank Mark Spiegel and Alexis Anderson for their helpful and 
insightful comments on earlier drafts of this work. To infer that each agrees with all of the 
conclusions drawn here, however, would be a mistake. I also wish to thank Andrew Sharp, 
Maris Abbene, and Michele Lerner for their valuable research assistance. 
1. Much has been written over the past two decades about informed consent and its 
applicability to lawyering. Several commentators and scholars have explored the general 
question of who controls whom within the attorney-client dyad. See, e.g., J. HEINZ & E. 
LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); D. ROSENTHAL, 
LAWYER AND CLIENT, WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974); Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 17 GA. L. REV. 
891 (1983); Kritzer, The Dimensions of Lawyer-Client Relationships: Notes Toward a The-
ory and a Field Study, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 409; Mazor, Power and Responsibility in 
the Attorney-Client Relation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1120 (1968). Other writers have focused that 
theme by addressing the "doctrine" of informed consent in law. See, e.g., Martyn, Informed 
Consent and the Legal Profession, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980); Maute, Allocation of 
Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 D.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1049 (1984); Peck, A New Tort Liability for Lack of Informed Consent in Legal 
Matters, 44 LA. L. REV. 1289 (1984); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: In-
formed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979); Strauss, Toward a 
Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C.L. 
REV. 315 (1987); cf. S. GILLERS & N. DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW & 
ETHICS 319 (1985) (informed consent an "emerging right"). Still others have approached the 
issue from a more philosophical perspective, with particular reference to the virtues of "cli-
ent-centeredness." See, e.g., D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A 
CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (1977); T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 3-20 
(1981); Katz, On Professional Responsibility, 80 COMM. L.J. 380 (1975); Lehman, The Pur-
suit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV., 1078 (1979); Shaffer, Christian Theories of 
Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 721, 728-38 (1974). Despite this increasing 
attention to informed consent, the literature thus far has failed to address informed consent 
considerations in the context of less-than-competent clients. 
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past; instead, the profession has grown in the realization that the 
most effective lawyering decisions are made by clients themselves.2 
There are times, however, when a lawyer adhering to this ideology 
believes that the client, whether because of advanced age, mental 
or physical illness, or similar disability, is not capable of. making 
informed choices, and if permitted to do so will injure himself or, 
at a minimum, fail to achieve the objectives of the representation. 
This Article attempts, at least in a preliminary fashion, to explore 
the avenues that might be open to an attorney in these circum-
stances. The term "preliminary" should be stressed, as the nature 
of the relationship between a lawyer and her possibly incompetent 
client is difficult to discern. The thoughts developed here can only 
begin to structure a workable theory for that interaction. 
The issue of informed consent and the impaired client has 
been addressed seldom, if ever, in the legal context. The matter 
has been explored somewhat more fully in the medical context,3 
where the ramifications of the informed consent doctrine in general 
have been debated more intensely.4 This Article's discussion of the 
role of the lawyer representing an impaired client, therefore, will 
2. See, e.g., D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note I, at 147-53; Freedman, A Lawyer 
Doesn't Always Know Best, 7 HUM. RTS. 28, 52 (1978); Shaffer, supra note 1, at 728; see also 
infra notes 31-48 and accompanying text. 
3. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHI-
CAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATION-
SHIP 167-88 (1982) [hereinafter MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]; S. JORDAN, DECISIONMAK-
ING FOR INCOMPETENT PERSONS: THE LAW AND MORALITY OF WHO SHALL DECIDE (1985); 
Brant, Last Rights: An Analysis of Refusal and Withholding of Treatment Cases, 46 Mo. L. 
REV. 337, 347-61 (1981); Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: 
Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L. 
REV. 413, 439; Solnick, Proxy Consent for Incompetent Non-Terminally III Adult Patients, 
6 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (1985). This is but a small sampling of the voluminous literature on 
treatment and competence in the medical field. 
It is not surprising that this issue has received greater attention in medical circles, be-
cause medical decisions are made almost invariably in the context of illness, which may 
impair consent and create hard choices for physicians. This fundamental difference between 
doctoring and lawyering, however, cannot justify the paucity of literature on competent in-
formed consent in the legal context. Lawyers also represent ill clients, and the crises that 
precipitate a decision to seek legal help might impair rational decisionmaking. 
4. See, e.g., P. ApPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT (1987); R. BURT, 
TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS (1979); J. 
CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE (1982); J. KATZ & A. 
CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT? (1975); Hagman, The Medical Pa-
tient's Right to Know: Report on a Medical-Legal-Ethical Empirical Study, 17 UCLA L. 
REV. 758 (1970); Meisel & Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A 
Review and Critique of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1983); Plant, The De-
cline of "Informed Consent," 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91 (1978). 
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draw on the suggestions developed for physicians, I) but for several 
reasons what works for medical professionals may not work equally 
well for lawyers. 
The lawyer's great difficulty in proceeding with representation 
of a confused client should be apparent. The most obvious problem 
is the considerable tension between the ethical requirement6 that 
the lawyer permit the client to make decisions and the lawyer's 
considered judgment that to do so not only would fail to achieve 
the purposes of the representation but also would be to follow an 
instruction that the client would not give in more lucid times.' 
Looming in the 1?ackground is the doctrine of presumed compe-
tence, asserting that it is not permissible ethically or legally for one 
person (the lawyer) unilaterally to usurp the authority of another 
(the client) without either that person's consent or court permis-
sion.8 For lawyers in particular this dilemma is heightened because 
they face a peculiar role tension that may serve to prohibit any 
attempt on their part to obtain court permission to usurp a client's 
decisionmaking authority. A lawyer who seeks to establish a guard-
ianship or similar proxy for her client will run afoul of numerous 
professional responsibility concerns, most notably those of loyalty,9 
5. This is especially true when the role of the family in proxy decisionmaking, and 
the role of persuasion and "fraternal correction" in obtaining consent, are addressed. See 
infra notes 220-31 and 276-85 and accompanying text. 
6. To characterize the doctrine of informed consent as an "ethical requirement" may 
be an overstatement given the profession's lack of clarity on this issue. The prevailing ABA 
standards of professional responsibility are less than definitive on this point. See infra notes 
105-36 and accompanying text. Nor have courts clearly mandated informed consent. See 
Maute, supra note 1, at 1085-1106 (discussion of cases on decisionmaking allocation). It 
would be fair to say that, in general, the authorities recognize the client's ultimate authority 
to make significant decisions that arise during the representation, albeit perhaps after con-
siderable influence or persuasion by the lawyer, and that otherwise the lawyer is permitted 
wide latitude in choosing the means of accomplishing the client's goals. See Strauss, supra 
note 1, at 318-20; infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
7. There is authority from the medical context asserting that decisionmaking for an 
incompetent person must rest on what that person would have chosen were the person com-
petent-an heuristic known as "substituted judgment." See, e.g., Superintendent of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31 (1977); S. 
JORDAN, supra note 3, at 71-76; Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Sub-
stituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 57-68 (1976). 
8. This principle has been stated most emphatically by courts facing questions of 
medical decisionmaking. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 
308 (1983); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935-36 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rennie v. Klein, 
720 F.2d 266, 269-70 (3d Cir. 1983). 
9. The American Bar Association's MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
(1969) [hereinafter MODEL CODE], as well as its more recently adopted MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES], each impose a duty of loyalty to 
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zeal/O and confidentiality.H Yet if her client's competence is seri-
ously in doubt, the lawyer may not possess the agency authority to 
act at all on her client's behalf. 12 
The legal profession thus far has offered little meaningful 
guidance to those lawyers-and there are many-who find them-
selves in this quandary. The ethical standards promulgated by the 
American Bar Association13 seek to address this point, but in a 
fashion that on analysis is less than coherent.14 Some courts have 
addressed the question of the appropriate role for counsel ap-
pointed to represent allegedly incompetent wards or defendants in 
commitment, guardianship, or similar parens patriae or police 
power proceedings. 11; The opinions of these courts, however, tend 
to be based on considerations other tlian informed consent or cli-
ent choice, and hence are of less direct value to this inquiry. Courts 
have seldom, if ever, addressed this question in the context of 
civil16 representation of clients whose competence might be 
the client. MODEL CODE Canon 5; MODEL RULES Rule 1.7. See generally Patterson, Legal 
Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909 (1980); Developments in the 
Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1981) [hereinafter 
Conflicts of Interest]. 
10. MODEL CODE, supra note 9, Canon 7; MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rules 1.1, 1.2. 
See generally Schwartz, The Zeal of the· Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543. 
11. MODEL CODE, supra note 9, Canon 4; MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.6. See 
generally M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 1-8 (1975). 
12. Fundamentally, a lawyer's authority to act on behalf of a client stems from her 
status as the client's agent. "In our legal system, an attorney is [her] client's agent and 
representative; the client retains ultimate authority over the conduct of litigation." Prate v. 
Freedman, 583 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1978). This principle not only permits courts to hold 
parties liable for the negligence of their chosen counsel, see Mazor, supra note 1, at 1121-34, 
but its accompanying effect is to deny a lawyer the power to act except under delegated 
authority, either explicit or implicit, from her principal. An incompetent principal possesses 
no authority to empower his agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 20-21 (1958). 
13. See MODEL CODE, supra note 9, EC 7-12; MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14. 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 105-36. 
15. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Quesnell v. State, 83 
Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973); State ex rei Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 
109, 125-26 (W. Va. 1974). Those who have commented on this issue have supported the 
notion that in cases of police power or parens patriae proceedings the role of the lawyer is 
to be a "zealous advocate." 
16. This Article addresses only the issues raised by representation of incompetent cli-
ents in civil proceedings. Its conclusions, therefore, will apply better in the civil than in the 
criminal arena. The distinction rests on differences in a lawyer's role in the two contexts as 
well as on the divergent constitutional mandates. Nevertheless, issues raised by criminal 
practice are employed by analogy in the analysis. See infra note 219. 
Criminal practice is different for the following reasons. Most important, the obligation 
of the defense attorney to obtain the acquittal of acquittable defendants is a paramount 
role, and may even transcend the duty to follow client wishes. For example, even if an ac-
cused wishes to plead guilty, such a plea may be inappropriate. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. 
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borderline. I? 
This Article will begin to assess critically the various options 
available to lawyers in this situation. It argues that the presump-
tion of competence (and hence adherence to client choice even 
when seemingly not maximizing benefits) must remain the domi-
nant approach to this problem, but that it need not remain the 
universal one. In certain cases, lawyers must recognize that a cli-
ent's competence is seriously in question and that they therefore 
may interact with such a client differently than they do with 
unimpaired clients. This preliminary concession seems unavoida-
ble; from there, unfortunately, the waters become more muddied. 
On reflection, however, it appears that the range of choices availa-
ble to a lawyer in such circumstances is reasonably finite. She 
might (1) simply withdraw; (2) seek a guardian for her client, ei-
ther by serving herself as the petitioner or by recruiting a third 
party to accomplish this task; (3) seek unofficial consent from a 
family member or close friend; (4) seek to persuade her client to 
make different and "better" choices (an approach that arguably is 
inappropriate with unimpaired clients);18 (5) proceed as a de facto 
guardian, simply making choices for her client without actual con-
sent; or (6) continue to presume competence irrebuttably, follow-
l1(F)j North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)j Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role 
in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975). The civil attorney has no such obligation to 
"win" over the objections of her client. In addition, criminal defense lawyers are often ap-
pointed by the court precisely to play the role of putting the state to its proof. As noted 
below in the context of civil commitment appointments, the court-ordered designation of 
role transcends informed consent considerations, and therefore distinguishes such cases 
from other civil cases. This is not to imply that informed consent issues do not arise in 
criminal practice, or that the dilemmas arising from representation of a questionably com-
petent criminal defendant are any less poignant. See Bennett, A Guided Tour Through 
Selected ABA Standards Relating to Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
375, 381-87 (1985)j Chernoff & Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical Quicksand, 10 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 505 (1972). The American Bar Association recently has developed pro-
posed standards for criminal justice mental health issues, particularly the question of in-
competence to stand trial. ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS (1984). For 
background and procedural history of the standards, see George, The American Bar Associ-
ation's Mental Health Standards: An Overview, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 338 (1985). 
17. This Article tends to neglect the profoundly impaired client and concentrates in-
stead on clients whose competence is merely questionable. Such clients present more thorny 
difficulties for the lawyer, at least in the realm of informed consent. With plainly nonfunc-
tioning individuals, the lawyer-client relationship has likely been established via a proper 
proxy consent or a court orderj in such cases strict adherence to ordinary conceptions of 
informed consent may not apply. See infra notes 137-53 and accompanying text. 
18. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 1, at 205-06 (it is inappropriate for the lawyer to 
affect the client's decision except when the client has made an extremely detrimental 
decision). 
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ing her client's requests regardless of consequences. These limited 
alternatives serve as the basis for this Article's analysis. This list19 
demonstrates that there is no option available that does not com-
promise some valued principles of the attorney-client relationship. 
Choosing or prioritizing among them, therefore, is no small task. 
This Article concludes that, although all of these options are 
troublesome, they are not all equally acceptable from an ethical 
perspective. Withdrawal is not considered in any great detail, for it 
seemingly offers nothing except a sidestepping of the quandary.20 
Petitioning for a guardian presents serious role and professional 
responsibility problems and is difficult to justify, although it may 
be warranted as the only plausible choice.21 Recruiting a third 
party to obtain a guardian resolves some, but clearly not all, of the 
professional responsibility concerns. It also creates additional ethi-
19. The list, and this Article as a whole, plainly refer only to instances in which the 
client's failing competence becomes problematic after an attorney-client relationship has 
been established. The distinctiqn is an important one. If the client has not consulted or 
retained the lawyer before his competence becomes impaired, the rights and responsibilities 
of the lawyer are very different from those discussed below. If no attorney-client relation-
ship exists, the lawyer may be free to consult social service or mental health professionals in 
an attempt to assist the client. In addition, if relatives or agency personnel contact the 
lawyer on behalf of the failing client, as is typical, no attorney-client relationship is possible 
absent some legitimate, informed consent by the proposed client or his authorized proxy. 
20. Depending on the stage of the proceedings, withdrawal may be an option for a 
lawyer who cannot maintain a continuing relationship with her client by reason of the lat-
ter's decreasing faculties. The ABA Model Code and Model Rules each permit withdrawal 
under those circumstances. See MODEL CODE, supra note 9, DR 2-110(C)(I)(d) (client by his 
conduct "renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out [herl employment 
effectively"); MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.16(b)(5) ("the representation ... has been 
rendered unreasonably difficult by the client"). Although withdrawal may be available, it is 
not satisfactory from an ethical perspective. It may promote the lawyer's peace of mind, but 
it leaves unappealing consequences in its wake: either the client's cause is left abandoned 
(when successor counsel cannot be obtained), or the ethical problems are passed on to suc-
cessor counsel, who repeats the process. A similar sentiment has been expressed regarding a 
lawyer's choice to withdraw when faced with a client who intends to commit perjury. See 
Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hard-
est Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1476 (1966) (withdrawal is "indefensible" on ethical 
grounds). Two other considerations about withdrawal deserve note. First, whether one can 
withdraw from litigation without revealing the client's difficulties to the court is not at all 
clear, and yet to reveal those difficulties contravenes the ethical mandate to maintain the 
client's confidences. See supra note 11, infra notes 191-92; cf. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 
727 (9th Cir. 1978) (revelation of perjury by withdrawal motion is prohibited). Second, once 
a client has lost competence the attorney may have no legal authority to continue the repre-
sentation and thus may be mandated to withdraw, notwithstanding the ethical difficulties. 
The discussion below on proxy or substituted consent offers some suggestions on the availa-
ble methods of continuing representation after the client arguably has ceased to function as 
a competent decisionmaker. See infra notes 221-31 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text. 
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cal problems.22 Reliance on a family member as a proxy deci-
sionmaker is a rather attractive suggestion and tends to be the so-
lution relied on most often by physicians. It is hardly a perfect 
solution because it leaves many conceptual inconsistencies un-
resolved.23 Persuasion is risky, but arguably more justifiable than it 
might initially appear, in that it minimizes role conflicts and recog-
nizes some measure of client autonomy.24 Finally, this Article re-
jects the notion of lawyer as "de facto" guardian.25 The lack of ac-
countability and side constraints, failure to serve the client's 
autonomy needs, and invitation to lawyer overreaching all render 
this approach very suspect. Unfortunately, the ABA's published 
ethical standards implicitly or explicitly have legitimated this type 
of unilateral usurpation of client decisionmaking. Section IV of 
this Article argues that such an approach is unwise. 
I. THE TRADITION OF INFORMED CONSENT 
Before turning to the actual decisionmaking methods that law-
yers might employ with impaired clients, certain preliminary mat-
ters must be addressed. Because the difficulties discussed in this 
Article arise predominantly as a result of the tensions imposed by 
the informed consent doctrine, the normative justifications for that 
doctrine must be considered. Only with some understanding of 
how and why informed consent controls the attorney-client rela-
tionship can we appreciate the dilemmas caused by attempts to 
diverge from its teachings. 
Informed consent may be viewed from the two vantage points 
of practice and theory. Sometimes the two dovetail, but often they 
do not. It is apparent that informed consent is a rather inconsis-
tent phenomenon in practice. There are segments of the bar, per-
haps large segments, that do not practice "client-centered" law 
even though they are likely to accept the notion of lawyers as cli-
ent agents.26 These lawyers are apt to decide for their clients as 
22. See infra notes 194-206 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 220-31 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 263-95 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 232-61 and accompanying text. 
26. The evidence for this conclusion is not entirely anecdotal, although informal obser-
vation of the practicing bar certainly supports this generalization. The empirical studies 
that have been performed show a pattern of non-client-centered lawyering. See J. HEINZ & 
E. LAUMANN, supra note 1, at 101-04 (personal hemisphere lawyers possess greater control 
over their clients than do corporate hemisphere lawyers); D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 1, at 13-
16, app. A; Alschuler, supra note 16. The most prominent spokesperson for this "profession-
alism" or "paternalist" view has been Talcott Parsons. See T. PARSONS, The Professions and 
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often as clients do for themselves, and are apt to influence the de-
cisions that clients make. For these lawyers, who implicitly accept 
the paternalism and professionalism ideologies,27 interaction with 
impaired clients presents fewer significant dilemmas, for the cli-
ent's ability to participate has never been a condition precedent 
for representation. Still, the matter is not entirely untroublesome, 
for virtually all lawyers recognize that clients are responsible for 
the major critical decisions in a case.28 
From the perspective of theory, the problem's intractability is 
heightened. This perspective has been more recently articulated by 
scholars and critics of the bar who challenge what they perceive as 
paternalistic lawyering and professional dominance of the relation-
ship.29 There is no doubt a significant segment of the bar shares 
this desire to be faithful to the underpinnings of informed con-
sent.30 From this perspective, representing impaired clients is in-
deed troubling, for conventional notions of informed consent will 
not apply. 
The remainder of this section will introduce the emerging the-
ory of informed consent as viewed from the theoretical perspective. 
It will address briefly two of the more significant considerations. 
First, the normative question: Why is this doctrine justified or de-
sirable? Second, the tactical question: How can lawyers best in-
volve clients in the decisionmaking process? 
A. The Client-Centeredness Model 
A common approach to informed consent in the attorney-cli-
Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34-49 (1954). 
27. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 1, at 13; Maute, supra note 1, at 1058. 
28. See MODEL CODE, supra note 9, EC 7-7 (client has exclusive authority to decide 
whether to, e.g., accept settlement). 
29. The first significant challenge to lawyer paternalism was issued by Professor Rich-
ard Wasserstrom, in Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975). 
Others have followed with more sophisticated critiques of the traditional view of the attor-
ney-client dyad. See, e.g., Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 
454; Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 
WIS. L. REV. 29, 52-59. Other scholars have approached the problem from a slightly different 
perspective, focusing on the logistics of the relationship and the law of agency to develop 
working theories of informed consent. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 1, passim; Martyn, 
supra note 1; Maute, supra note 1. 
30. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 1, at 143-204 (many lawyers favor the participating 
model and are more successful as a result); Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Profes-
sional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 917 (study of bar disciplinary practices and 
client satisfaction as affected by adoption of participation model). 
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ent relationship may be referred to as "client-centeredness,"31 that 
is, the conviction that the client, and not the lawyer, should remain 
the primary decisionmaker. In exploring why this model is em-
ployed, it should be recognized that client-centeredness is at once 
both viscerally logical and perplexingly counterintuitive. It is logi-
cal because the lawyer, as an agent hired by a client to achieve 
some goal,32 will naturally look to her principal for direction and 
instructions. It is the client's case, the client's life and the client's 
money paying the bill, so it makes sense for him to call the shots. 
Yet at the same time the notion is deeply discomforting and illogi-
cal to professionals and to adherents of the ideology of profession-
alism.33 It is precisely because the lawyer possesses skill, expertise, 
and training that she was hired by the client, and the idea of al-
lowing, even encouraging, the less knowledgeable and less skilled 
party to be in charge seems plainly counterproductive.34 
If client-centeredness is justified, it is because the counterin-
tuitive objections prove to be less persuasive than they first ap-
pear. Client decisionmaking may be defended by a combination of 
de ontological theories of autonomy and utilitarian arguments 
about effective representation. The autonomy concern is an impor-
tant one.31i Just as a patient has a strong autonomy interest in 
31. The phrase "client-centered" has become rather popular since employed by David 
Binder and Susan Price in their classic text on interviewing and counseling skills. D. BINDER 
& S. PRICE, supra note 1. It is very much an outgrowth of Carl Rogers' theories of psycho-
therapeutic nonintervention. See C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961); C. ROGERS, 
COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (1942). Thomas Shaffer's counseling techniques employ a 
similar client-centered and Rogerian approach. See T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, LEGAL INTER-
VIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1987); T. SHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND 
COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL (1976). 
32. See supra note 12. 
33. Soon-to-be professionals seem to share ,the same perplexity. The author's experi-
ence in a clinical setting with students first exposed to the client-centered counseling theo-
ries of David Binder and Susan Price, D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note I, has shown not 
infrequent reluctance by students to delegate or return decisionmaking authority to the cli-
ent. Their reasoning generally follows the counterintuitive analysis described in the text. 
34. These arguments apply to, and are asserted by, doctors who are asked to permit 
patients to make final medical decisions notwithstanding the doctor's greater expertise. 
If you are a good doctor, your patients trust you; and if you are going to be their 
doctor, you had better trust them. You tell them to do something, and they do 
it-which is a form of consent. I do not think you can tell a patient exactly the situa-
tion no matter how hard you try, unless he happens to be a physician or a scientist. 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EXPERIMENTATION WITH 
HUMAN SUBJECTS 34 (1967) (remarks of David D. Rutstein, M.D., Harvard Medical Schoo!), 
quoted in Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient 
Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1537 n.lO (1970). 
35. See Spiegel, supra note I, at 73-77; Strauss, supra note 1, at 336-41. The concept 
of autonomy is the fundamental root of informed consent in medicine as well. See J. CHIL-
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maintaining control over his body,36 a client possesses an equally 
significant autonomy interest in controlling his affairs,37 in assuring 
that his values are expressed, and in avoiding control and manipu-
lation by another who may have greater status.38 Permitting a cli-
ent to make the significant decisions, particularly when the choice 
made is contrary to the lawyer's preference, fosters autonomy and 
tends to ensure that client values are realized.39 
The autonomy argument for informed consent is in some ways 
easier to make than the effective representation argument. Stand-
ing alone the autonomy argument is not counterintuitive. It makes 
sense for clients to have the responsibility for their own affairs. 
The difficult objection to autonomy concerns the role of the law-
yer's expertise and skill. Although critics might acknowledge au-
tonomy as a deeply held value, they would nevertheless argue that 
fostering autonomy by allowing unskilled laypersons navigating in 
arcane waters to make misguided and ill-considered decisions 
seems quite perverse.40 
The response to this objection has been utilitarian and empiri-
cal. The professionalism argument assumes that decisions made in 
the context of legal representation have correct answers-solutions 
that can be divined by the application of expertise, training, and 
DRESS, supra note 4, at 59-65. In an early medical informed consent opinion, Judge Cardozo 
wrote: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his 
patient's consent, commits an assault." Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 
129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); see also R. BURT, supra note 4; J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859); 
Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 340, 366-69 (1974) (protection of status as "human being"); Shultz, From Informed 
Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985) (patient 
autonomy should be protected and recognized as distinct legal interest). 
Critics of informed consent generally deny neither the impact that professional domi-
nance has on autonomy, nor that autonomy is an important interest. Instead they point to 
the inherent conflict (in the case of medicine) between preserving autonomy and fostering 
good health. See P. ApPELBAUM, C. LlDz & A. MEISEL, supra note 4, at 28-31. When the two 
are perceived to be in conflict, critics charge that health interests should prevail. See 
Chayet, Informed Consent of the Mentally Disabled: A Failing Fiction, 6 PSYCHIATRIC AN-
NALS 295 (1976); Meisel, supra note 3, at 413-18 (summarizing the criticisms). 
36. See Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983); Shultz, supra 
note 35, at 220. 
37. See Spiegel, supra note 1, at 75-76. 
38. See Wasserstrom, supra note 29, at 15-24 (lawyers' manipUlation of clients and 
treatment of clients as nonpersons is morally objectionable); Simon, supra note 29, at 52-59. 
39. T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 3-20; Shaffer, supra note 1, at 728-30. 
40. See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 1, at 7-27 (summarizing this criticism in the 
legal context); Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 
137 (1977) (criticism in the medical context). 
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skill to a given set of facts. This assumption, however, is faulty. 
Lawyers make such decisions by applying somewhat fixed princi-
ples to facts that are usually ambiguous,41 and by analyzing how a 
factfinder or arbiter (jury, judge, appellate panel) or perhaps an 
opposing party, is apt to apply those principles to the facts.42 The 
"science" of predicting legal results is notoriously imprecise,43 even 
if some generally confident assessments can be made in cases with 
clearer law, less disputed facts, and a known factfinder.44 The pre-
mise of the professionalism argument is the assumption that legal 
decisionmaking is susceptible to reasoned analysis, and that skilled 
and expert analysis will result in more effective decisionmaking. 
Although a significant part of the decisionmaking process indeed 
involves sophisticated and technical analysis, and thus cannot be 
accomplished successfully without expertise, not all of the process 
involves such analysis. Much of it involves subjective, value-based 
assessments of the relative attractiveness of choices. This part of 
the decisionmaking process cannot be accomplished by an expert 
technician; in fact, it probably can be accomplished adequately 
only by the person who will suffer the consequences of the 
decision. 
In fact, most decisions made in the context of legal representa-
tion consist of assessing risks.45 Most options available to clients, 
whether litigants or those seeking planning advice, involve choos-
ing, under conditions of uncertainty, among relative advantages 
and disadvantages.46 Even when the economic and legal conse-
quences of a particular option are clear (e.g., litigation may be very 
likely to achieve the objective sought), various nonlegal conse-
quences inevitably influence the choice (e.g., the stress, publicity, 
or duration of litigation might be of serious concern to the cli-
41. See D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION 2-3 (1984). 
42. See generally G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWVERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR 
CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 321-24 (1978); L. BROWN & E. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAW-
YERS: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS 275-76 (1978). 
43. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 42, at 1004-17. 
44. As an example, consider an experienced criminal defense attorney working in a 
conservative, blue-collar community. She might be very confident in her prediction to a 
black defendant, charged with a violent crime and against whom several respected white 
police officers will testify, claiming to be eye witnesses, that acquittal is almost an impossi-
bility. Such certainty of fact and law, however, is normally quite rare. 
45. See Spiegel, supra note I, at 100-04; D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note I, at 135-
55. 
46. For a sophisticated treatment of how decisions are made under conditions of un-
certainty, see D. KAHNEMAN, P. SLOVIC & A. TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982). 
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ent).47 Because choices must be based on values, risk aversion, so-
cial and psychological consequences, and the like, and not strictly 
on legal analysis, the client generally is in a superior position to 
make the "correct" choice on those fronts. The role of skill, exper-
tise, and legal judgment remains critical, of course, for only with 
the lawyer's considered assessment of the legal and financial conse-
quences of the options can the client properly weigh risks and de-
termine which option he prefers.48 The lawyer employs profes-
sional skill to define and explore all options available and to help 
the client determine how his choice will affect his interests or val-
ues. The client's knowledge of his own interests and values re-
quires that the final choices be his. 
Informed consent ideology and its preference for client-based 
decisionmaking are rooted in philosophical, psychological, and 
strategic considerations. Compared to the professionalism model, 
informed consent fosters more client autonomy, increases client 
satisfaction, and achieves "better" results. This constitutes the 
principled rationale underlying the informed consent doctrine in 
the legal profession.49 
Even under the informed consent doctrine there are, of course, 
47. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 1, at 138-40; T. SHAFFER, supra note 31, at 180-
93 (importance of feelings as facts to be dealt with in counseling process). 
48. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 1, at 143-44; Spiegel, supra note 1, at 104. Pro-
ponents of a medical informed consent doctrine present similar arguments in favor of pa-
tient decisionmaking. See, e.g., Meisel, supra note 3, at 420-21: 
The duty of disclosure aids in the realization of those goals [protecting physical and 
psychic integrity] by enabling (although neither assuring nor requiring) the patient to 
make the decision whether to be treated both on the basis of information about the 
treatment which is supplied by the doctor and information about other concerns sub-
jective to the patient, to which only he presumably has access. [Footnote omitted.] 
See also Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1646 (1974); 
Note, supra note 34, at 1534-35. 
49. This brief review of the premises of informed consent necessarily neglects some of 
the considerations that run counter to the doctrine. Questions about the viability of the 
doctrine focus on the client's ability to understand complex legal considerations, whether 
clients want to understand and play an active participant role, and whether clients who are 
under the pressures of legal difficulties in fact are better in tune with their own needs, 
values, and interests. For discussion of some of these matters, see D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 
1, at 7-27; Spiegel, supra note 1, at 85-115; Katz, supra note 40 (similar issues in medical 
context). For the purposes of this Article, fuller exploration of this aspect of the informed 
consent debate is not necessary. The Article's discussion of informed consent and the im-
paired client proceeds on the assumption that the considerations described in the text are 
valid and that the doctrine is otherwise workable. Only under such an assumption will con-
sideration of an impaired client exception to the informed consent doctrine matter. It 
should be noted, however, that in contrast to the serious debate in the literature about 
medical informed consent, see Meisel, supra note 3, little has been published critical of the 
doctrine as applied to lawyers. 
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decisions that will still be made by the lawyer with little or no cli-
ent input. The lawyer may make decisions that are not apt to af-
fect the client or the case significantly, such as the order of calling 
witnesses, arranging schedules, or the propriety of filing a motion.50 
(Of course, depending on the facts of the case, each of these exam-
ples may affect the client significantly and, therefore, could require 
consent.) Logistics, efficiency, the lawyer's interest in his craft,51 
and professional responsibility52 all dictate that clients cannot pos-
sess universal and exclusive decisionmaking authority. 
B. The Counseling Process 
The commitment to client decisionmaking will not be mean-
ingful unless lawyers employ counseling skills and methodologies 
that safeguard that right. Because of the disparity of status and 
power within the attorney-client relationship,53 a lawyer who ex-
presses a preference for one option while telling the client to de-
cide whether to accept it is unlikely to obtain "informed consent." 
Under ordinary circumstances,M a client will not be likely to resist 
the subtle or not-too-subtle influences of his lawyer. To the extent 
the lawyer recommends a decision that the client adopts, the ad-
vantages of client-centeredness are lost. 55 
50. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct expressly allocate decisions about 
"means," as opposed to "objectives," to the lawyer. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.2, 
comment AI. The Model Code implies the same allocation. See MODEL CODE, supra note 9, 
EC 7-7; see also Maute, supra note 1, at 1098 (supporting this general division of responsi-
bility); Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision-
making and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 1003, 1007-15. But see Spiegel, supra note 1, at 101 (the decision to try a case 
before a judge or jury may involve considerations not only of which factfinder will be most 
favorable, but also of client preference regarding the audience for his story). 
51. Spiegel, supra note 1, at 117. 
52. ld. The ABA's professional responsibility standards make clear the lawyer's duty 
to reject her client's instructions when to do otherwise would constitute fraud, illegal con-
duct, or ethical breach. See MODEL CODE, supra note 9, DR 7-102(A); MODEL RULES, supra 
note 9, Rule 1.2(d). 
53. See Wasserstrom, supra note 29, at 21-22 (lawyers dominate clients). See gener-
ally Simon, supra note 29 (same); but see Heinz, supra note 1, at 902-04 (corporate lawyers 
dominate clients far less). 
54. "Ordinary circumstances" refers to the "personal client hemisphere," as opposed 
to the "corporate client hemisphere." See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 1, at 384; 
Heinz, supra note 1, at 905. 
55. However, not all of the benefits identified by proponents of informed consent are 
lost by the approach described in the text. The process of lawyer recommendation with 
client input and final veto, while not encouraging client-based decisionmaking, nevertheless 
involves client participation in the process. This participation has inherent benefits. See D. 
ROSENTHAL, supra note 1, at 19-20 (satisfaction increases with client participation in deci-
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With these concerns in mind scholars have sought to develop 
counseling methods that minimize lawyer influence on client deci-
sionmaking.56 The most frequently taught57 counseling model, de-
veloped by David Binder and Susan Price,58 is premised explicitly 
on lawyer neutrality. It seeks to foster neutrality by both limiting 
lawyer decisionmaking and monitoring the lawyer's subtle and 
nonverbal communications. 59 According to this model, the lawyer's 
role is to identify consequences and to assist her client in assessing 
those consequences in light of his needs and values, without assert-
ing any opinion regarding the advisability of any options.60 The 
model purposefully avoids the use of any form of persuasion, for 
persuasion is apt to be successful, defeating the purposes of client 
decisionmaking.61 Only in the case of a "difficult client" does the 
Binder and Price model contemplate more judgmental and less 
sionmaking); Maute, supra note 1, at 1060 (lawyer-client relationships should be more satis-
factory with client participation in decisionmaking). Granting the client final decisionmak-
ing authority arguably promotes his autonomy as well. See infra notes 282-85 and 
accompanying text. But see Thompson, Psychological Issues in Informed Consent, in 3 
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 3, 83, 119-10 (app.) (questioning whether an 
"illusion of freedom" is not more harmful than helpful). 
56. It is surprising that so little has been written in the medical context about the role 
of persuasion and doctor influence on patient decisionmaking, given the obvious impact that 
this can have on the realization of informed consent. Some authorities, such as the Presi-
dent's Commission on Ethics in Medicine, simply assume its acceptability. See 1 MAKING 
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 66, 77-78. Recently more thoughtful approaches 
have at least considered the impact of physician influence, although to the extent that per-
suasion occurs it is seldom criticized. See J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PA-
TIENT, 156-59 (1984); Thompson, supra note 55, at 111. 
57. The Binder and Price model serves as the most widely used model within clinical 
education programs for teaching client counseling skills. See Frank & Krause, Book Review, 
18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1427, 1427 n.3 (1985) (survey performed by authors). 
58. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 1. 
59. Id. at 166, 168. 
60. Id. at 166. 
61. Id. Critics of informed consent in medicine argue that such influence is never ab-
sent, and thus the concept of free patient choice is illusory, "because disclosure can (and 
indeed usually will) be made by the physician in such a way as to assure that the patient 
agrees to the treatment." Meisel, supra note 3, at 416 (making hypothetical argument of 
critics) (citing Beecher, Some Guiding Principles for Clinical Investigation, 195 J.A.M.A. 
1135, 1135 (1966) ("patients will, if they trust their doctor, accede to almost any request he 
cares to make"); see also Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 465, 466 (1972). Notwithstanding this real risk, the medical profession does not appear 
to have developed or encouraged a standard of dialogue for the physician-patient relation-
ship that would call for neutral and nonjudgmental communication of information by the 
doctor. See supra note 56. 
Whether a profession can ever develop a truly neutral and noninfluencing method of 
interaction between professional and client is very questionable. Robert Burt has pointed 
out mutuality and interdependence of all interactive choices. R. BURT, supra note 4, passim. 
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neutral tactics.62 They suggest that in appropriate cases it is per-
missible for the lawyer to provide her opinion of the best option,63 
and in more extreme cases for her to seek to persuade the client 
not to make "extremely detrimental" decisions.64 While Binder 
and Price allude only briefly to more serious forms of intervention, 
they apparently concede that the informed consent process to 
which they are so firmly committed might not apply to less ra-
tional clients.611 
62. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 1, at 192-210. "Difficult clients" are defined 
by the authors as: 
(1) Clients who are extremely indecisive. 
(2) Clients who insist upon obtaining the lawyer's opinion of what should be 
done. 
(3) Clients who have already reached a decision and are not interested in con-
sidering other alternatives. 
(4) Clients who, in the lawyer's judgment, are making extremely detrimental 
decisions. 
Id. at 192. 
63. Id. at 197-200. The authors distinguish between "independent decision makers" 
and "passive decision makers." Id. at 197. The former are strong-willed, capable individuals 
who want to hear what the lawyer would choose so as to add that fact to their deliberative 
package. Binder and Price conclude that there is little risk in offering opinions to those 
clients.ld. at 198. Passive decisionmakers, on the other hand, expect lawyer advice and will 
likely be influenced by it. Id. at 66. The authors caution that giving opinions to such clients 
is risky, but may be unavoidable if client frustration is too great. Id. at 200. 
64. Id. at 203-10. 
65. Id. at 204-07. The development of a rationale for an impaired client exception to 
Binder and Price's model may lead to a more general reevaluation of the model itself. Al-
though an in depth critique of that model is not appropriate for this Article (nor, admit-
tedly, has one been developed adequately by this author), some concerns about how Binder 
and Price perceive the attorney-client interaction deserve brief mention. 
One thematic concern is the model's perception of lawyer neutrality, conceptualized to 
create a feeling of separateness and objectivity vis-a-vis the client. The model's description 
of the process of interviewing and counseling minimizes, or eliminates, the factor of relation-
ship. By setting up a separate, neutral lawyer who only slightly influences client decisions, 
and who interacts mechanically with clients, the model diverges from important theories of 
interpersonal interaction. 
There are those who view the interaction as far more complex, a "rhythmic psychologi-
cal ballet" in which the roles and feelings of each party are critical to the performance. A 
STRAUSS, MIRRORS AND MASKS: THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 55 (1959), quoted in Elkins, Book 
Review, 30 VAND. L. REV. 923, 931 (1977). The realization that one party's responses in an 
interaction are inextricably bound up with the perceptions, feelings, and needs of the other 
party is generally accepted. R BURT, supra note 4, at 43-45. The role of transference and 
countertransference in relationships, including attorney-client relationships, has been sug-
gested as an important focal point from which to study and understand the counseling pro-
cess. T. SHAFFER, supra note 31, at 161-80; A WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING 
AND COUNSELING PROCESS 24, 24-25 (1976). By emphasizing the dichotomy of lawyer choice 
versus client choice (an heuristic that is also maintained to a large degree in this Article), 
Binder and Price objectify a much more fluid, dynamic, and dialectic process, overlooking 
the fact that decisions are mutually interactive. This point is made elegantly by Robert Burt 
in his discussion of physicians, and his suggestions apply equally well to lawyers. R BURT, 
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The remainder of this Article will explore more fully the con-
clusion suggested by Binder and Price that "difficult" clients war-
rant more intervention and less neutrality from their lawyers. The 
remedies Binder and Price suggest-opinions and occasional per-
suasion-will be analyzed along with more paternalistic remedies, 
such as pursuing guardianship or taking over the decisionmaking 
process. The purpose is not to critique Binder and Price. Rather, it 
is to explore the rationale for, and the limits of, the "special" treat-
ment that they have recognized as appropriate for "special" 
clients. 
II. ASSESSING DIMINISHED COMPETENCE 
An overarching question preliminarily dominates this inquiry: 
If lawyers believe their clients are less than competent, may they 
treat them differently? Before this Article addresses how lawyers 
might treat such clients differently, it will answer that preliminary 
question affirmatively, first by offering two examples of client be-
havior that might cause a lawyer to question the client's compe-
tence, and second by addressing the question more directly, albeit 
more theoretically. 
A. Two Examples 
Example 1-Imagine a lawyer representing Mr. H, an elderly 
widower previously diagnosed as suffering from mental illness. The 
lawyer has represented Mr. H in his attempt to obtain old age and 
disability benefits. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the law-
yer is publicly financed and thus charges no fee for her services.66 
supra note 4. 
66. Publicly funded lawyers have been available to poor, elderly people since 1965 
under Title III-B of the Older Americans Act, a federal program that provides funding for 
social services, including legal services, to the nation's elderly. 42 U.S.C. § 3001; 45 C.F.R. § 
1321.73. 
Deleting from this consideration the issue of payment of fees simplifies and clarifies the 
client choice dilemma, for the obligation of the lawyer to represent a client zealously is 
unaffected by the absence of a fee. Cf. Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Con-
fronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. REV. 337, 354-62 
(1978) (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1359 
(1976) (legal services lawyers owe clients full degree of zeal and attention»; Bellow, Turning 
Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NAT'L LEGAL AID D.A. BRIEFCASE 
106 (1977). 
For lawyers representing paying clients, the fundamental issues remain the same, but 
their resolution may be much more complex. For instance, a client with failing faculties may 
neglect to pay his lawyer's fees. If the lawyer wants to sidestep the ethical dilemma raised 
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Mr. H has recently been exhibiting symptoms of the beginning 
stages of Alzheimer's disease.67 The present problem is triggered 
when he calls his lawyer to tell her that he has received some offi-
cial looking papers that he does not understand. She goes to his 
house, which he has owned for thirty-five years, and reviews the 
papers. The documents include an eviction notice from a real es-
tate speculator who claims that he now owns Mr. H's home. The 
lawyer recognizes the name of the speculator as an unscrupulous 
foreclosure sale operator who has obtained fraudulent title to 
many homes in recent years. The speculator claims title to the 
house based on a lien contract that may have been forged or that 
Mr. H may have signed without understanding its nature. 
Mr. H is terribly distraught about the prospect of losing his 
home. He calls the lawyer repeatedly, sometimes crying, other 
times angrily demanding that she resolve the matter immediately. 
The lawyer's research shows that she has a very strong case for 
by the client's incompetence, she might use failure to pay as a basis for withdrawal. See 
MODEL CODE, supra note 9, DR 2-110(C)(1)(f); MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.16(b)(4), 
comment ~ 8. Whether a lawyer properly may cease representation under such circum-
stances is not clear, particularly if the client would be prejudiced or if the lawyer believes 
that failure to pay is the result of the client's illness. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETH-
ICS 543 (1986). On the other hand, a lawyer whose fees have been neglected may have a 
greater incentive to intervene to have a lawful proxy appointed for the client, because the 
proxy (who might even be the lawyer herself) could resume payment of the client's obliga-
tions (including, of course, the unpaid attorney's fees). 
Alternatively, the client may pay the fees and proceed to demand action that the lawyer 
believes is short-sighted and not competently reasoned. In such circumstances the lawyer 
may feel financial pressure to comply with the client's wishes. This quandary at least ap-
proaches a conflict of interest between the lawyer, who needs income, and the client, who 
will pay only if the lawyer refrains from interfering with the client's illogical choices. Cf. 
Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting potential conflict of 
interest between civil rights lawyer and client when attorney's fees claim must be waived as 
condition of settlement offer favorable to client). 
Although employing a publicly funded lawyer in the hypothetical simplifies the issue 
considered in this Article, it could also create additional ethical issues not apparent in this 
example. The most prominent and difficult problem faced by such lawyers is caused by their 
perceived role as "elder advocates," who can be called on to intervene on behalf of elders by 
social service providers, without any request from the affected elder. Even though it is 
tempting, both morally and emotionally, to play out this "muckraker" role, lawyers have no 
authority to take legal action on behalf of any person without either that person's consent or 
authorized proxy consent. 
67. Alzheimer's disease is a form of "senile dementia," a primary degenerative demen-
tia that includes a confusional stage marked by a decline in memory. See AMERICAN PSYCHI-
ATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed.) (DSM ill) 
290 (1980); Stanley, Senile Dementia and Informed Consent, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 57, 58-59 
(1983). As the disease approaches its dementia phase, memory, judgment, reasoning, and 
psychomotor functioning decline progressively. Id. at 59. There is no known cure for the 
disease. Id. . 
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injunctive relief and damages. When she meets with Mr. H to 
counsel him about th/a case and her plans to file suit, he has be-
come increasingly confused, suspicious, and angry. He denies her 
permission to file any paper in a public court, telling her that his 
deceased sister and the devil are behind this, and that filing any 
papers in court-raven an answer to the eviction complaint-will 
cause his sister and the devil to harass him more. After several 
counseling sessions, during which his descriptions of persecution 
increase in detail and vigor, as does his refusal to authorize any 
legal action, Mr. H finally accuses the lawyer of being party to the 
speculator's fraud and in league with the devil and fires her. Mr. H 
has neither the money to hire a private lawyer nor any family or 
other support network. From prior experience the lawyer is confi-
dent that the speculator will not hesitate to enforce his default 
judgment by evicting Mr. H so that he can sell the home.68 
Example 2-Suppose a lawyer has been retained by Mr. M, a 
seventy-year-old nursing home resident who wants to challenge the 
shabby treatment he receives in the home. Assume again that the 
representation is free,69 and that Mr. M was referred to the lawyer 
by his adult daughter, to whom he had complained about the facil-
ity and its staff. After having participated actively in an attorney-
client relationship with his lawyer, Mr. M suffers a stroke. As a 
result, his ability to reason diminishes considerably and the lawyer 
finds it very difficult to have a meaningful conversation with him. 
He remains cooperative, but the lawyer fears too much so-he 
seemingly will agree to anything she suggests. 
The lawyer must now consider whether to file a lawsuit, per-
haps even a class action, against the home. There are obvious risks 
in this strategy. Not only would Mr. M likely be the recipient of 
further mistreatment because of his "troublemaker" status, but 
there is also a slim chance that, if the lawsuit were to reach the 
attention of public health officials, they might decertify the facility 
for Medicaid purposes, forcing Mr. M to find another home. Fur-
ther complicating this decision is the likelihood that the lawyer 
could recover her fees if the suit were successful. 
These examples, only two among an infinite number raising 
68. This example is based on a composite of two clients represented in the past by the 
author. The type of fraudulent foreclosure/speculation scam described, sadly, was common 
in South Central Los Angeles in the late 1970s and early 19805. See, e.g., 1000 Could Lose 
Homes, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 1. 
69. See supra note 66. 
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comparable tensions/a present very difficult personai and profes-
sional choices for a lawyer. In either case doing nothing seems un-
conscionable, but doing anything seems unethical. The lawyer's 
first consideration must be whether it is appropriate to act on her 
own assessment of her client's competence. Only if she concludes 
that it is appropriate may she proceed to consider how, if at all, 
she is to intervene. 
B. The Question of Competence 
Before deciding whether to intervene on behalf of Mr. H or 
Mr. M, a lawyer would need to consider the question of their com-
petence, for it is only if they are incompetent that intervention 
could possibly be justified.71 The competence issue divides into 
three elements. First, one must accept the premise that incompe-
tence exists, that is, that there are persons who, because of some 
type of disability, are not choosing their actions and are not able to 
appreciate and judge the quality of their conduct.72 Second, having 
accepted the first premise, one must be able to distinguish incom-
petent behavior from competent but different, foolish, or unwise 
70. Other writers have offered their own examples of client behavior that tempts inter-
vention. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 1, at 203-04; Luban, Paternalism and the 
Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454, 455-56_ 
71. This point might not be absolute, but it is generally accepted as a premise of pa-
ternalism. The paternalism arguments presented in this Article draw on a "weak" version of 
legal paternalism, which posits that voluntary self-inflicted harm is not harm at all, and that 
intervention is therefore appropriate only if a showing is made that the harmful choice is 
involuntary_ Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 105, 108 (1971) states: 
[T)he reasons for this are that the coercion required to prevent such harm is itself a 
harm of such gravity that it is likely in the overwhelming proportion of cases to out-
weigh any good it can produce for the one coerced; and moreover, individuals them-
selves. _ . can know their own true interests better than any outsiders can, so that 
outside coercion is almost certain to be self-defeating. 
See also J. CHILDRESS, supra note 4, at 17; J. MILL. ON LIBERTY 101 (1978 ed.). By contrast, 
the "strong" version of paternalism would permit interference with voluntary and reasoned 
choice in order to protect the decisionmaker. Feinberg, supra, at 120. (Note that interfer-
ence to protect third parties is not paternalism. See Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY 
AND THE LAW 107, 108 (S. Wasserstrom ed. 1971).) Justification for "strong" paternalism is 
obviously more difficult, but for present purposes that battle need not be fought. The issue 
presented in this Article is how to respond when the client's self-destructive actions may be 
involuntary. Assume for the sake of argument that a voluntary choice, however harmful, 
must be respected, but that a delusional one need not be. This inquiry thus focuses on the 
"easy" question and sidesteps the more difficult paternalism questions raised by competent 
but self-destructive decisionmakers. 
72. See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (1978); 
Appelbaum & Roth, Clinical Issues in Assessment of Competence, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1462 (1981). See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
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behavior. "Competent but ... " behavior cannot be restrained (un-
less it is harmful to third parties, which is an entirely different 
consideration73). Third, the lawyer must define her role in such a 
determination. She needs to know whether she, qua lawyer, ought 
to be permitted to conclude that a client is impaired and based on 
that judgment treat that. client differently.74 
This Article accepts the first premise. There are, of course, 
contrary points of view. Some argue eloquently and persuasively 
that the behavior our culture labels mental illness is little more 
than culturally deviant. They claim that such behavior is labeled 
mental illness merely because it is different, and not because it is 
the product of any documented disorder or malfunction.75 Thus, 
the individuals who are categorized as mentally ill in fact have con-
trol over their actions; they act differently because they choose to 
do so. Because they could choose to do otherwise, one must respect 
their choices as long as they do not harm third parties.76 The con-
cept of choice or "control" is critically significant in mental health 
law because the fundamental reason for the law's treatment of per-
73. This inquiry is confined to the ethical issue of intervention to prevent client self-
injury, and not intervention to prevent the client from injuring a third party. Third party 
harm is an entirely different concern. It can be a much simpler issue, as when a client in-
tends to commit a serious crime that will cause death or substantial bodily injury. Most, 
perhaps all, ethical standards freely permit lawyers to intervene to prevent such harm. See 
MODEL CODE, supra note 9, DR 4-101(C)(3}; MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.6(b)(1} 
(each permits disclosure of client intention for purpose of preventing crime). It can also be 
just as difficult an issue, as when a client seeks to pursue a "noxious scheme" that is lawful 
but unjustly harmful to a third person. Scholars continue to debate the proper lawyer role 
in such circumstances. Compare, e.g., Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations 
of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1082-87 (1976); Pepper, The Lawyer's 
Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 613 (in defense of the lawyer's amoral role), with Luban, The Adversary System 
Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83 (D. Luban ed. 1983) (critical of the amoral characteriza-
tion); Simon, supra note 29, at 130-44. 
74. "Different treatment" usually means more restrictive of rights and privileges. This 
realization does not damn the endeavor; it merely recognizes that paternalism, even benign 
paternalism, necessarily infringes on the client's freedom. Dworkin, supra note 71, at 110. It 
is important to note, however, that it is too often abusive. See Mitchell, The Objects of Our 
Wisdom and Our Coercion: Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1405 (1979); Comment, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianship: Have the 
Elderly Freedom to Spend?, 73 YALE L.J. 676 (1964); Developments in the Law-Civil Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974). 
75. See generally N. KI'ITRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971); T. SZASZ. PSYCHIAT-
RIC SLAVERY (1977); T. SZASZ. THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961) [hereinafter T. SZASZ); 
Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 527 (1978). 
76. Morse, supra note 75, at 572-77 ("[c)laiming that a crazy person could not do oth-
erwise is little more than an intuitive hunch, a post hoc moral justification employed to 
reach the result of differential legal treatment"). 
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sons with alleged mental disorders, (e.g., insanity pleas, guardian-
ship, commitment, and antipsychotic medication) is that these in-
dividuals are acting with diminished control over their harmful or 
self-destructive actions.77 Accepting the contrary theory, that 
mental illness is mere labeling of otherwise neutral behavior, pro-
vides an easy solution for the lawyer. She can assume, for example, 
that Mr. H has chosen to sacrifice his home and his health, a 
choice that she must respect. Her assumptions about Mr. M are a 
bit more complicated. How she responds to his nonresponsiveness 
is addressed later.78 
Such a view of mental illness is not, of course, the dominant 
one in either law79 or psychiatry.8o The prevailing scientific and le-
gal attitude is that some people are mentally ill, i.e., have less con-
trol over their behavior and thought processes than people who are 
considered better adjusted. They do not choose to act "crazy"81 
and contrary to their conventional interests. Because society recog-
nizes mental illness and countenances extraordinary treatment of 
the mentally ill, it is important to determine the proper role of a 
lawyer representing an impaired client.82 That inquiry must as-
sume, at least arguendo, that mental illness as conventionally rec-
ognized does exist.83 
77. See generally A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 
(1976). 
78. See infra text accompanying notes 180-83. 
79. The law generally regards mentel illness as a real phenomenon rather than a mat-
ter of mere behavior categorization. Every state in the Union has developed a scheme for 
commitment of the mentally iII. See Developments in the Law, supra note 74 (review of all 
state statutes). The prevalence of the insanity defense is also a fundamental recognition 
that certain individuals do not possess the requisite control over their behavior to warrant 
punishment for their actions. See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 
1954); M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07(1) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962). 
80. The theories of Thomas Szasz are hardly the' conventional view within modem 
psychiatry. For an assessment of the psychiatric doctrine supporting the concept of lack of 
competence and the desirability of benign intervention, see READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIA-
TRY (R. Allen, E. Ferster, & J. Rubin eds. 1975); R REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH 
SYSTEM 491 (1985); A. STONE, supra note 77, at 43-66; Developments in the Law, supra note 
74, at 1212-20. 
81. The term "crazy" was adopted by Professor Morse, supra note 75, having followed 
the lead of Professor Alan Stone of Harvard, as a "nonjargon term that both describes the 
behavior considered mental disorder and avoids unwanted connotations." Id. at 554 n.44. 
82. It may be, see infra text accompanying notes 96-101, that as a matter of profes-
sional responsibility lawyers may not conclude that eccentric client behavior is mental ill-
ness, even though nonlawyers would reach such a conclusion. If such a prohibition exists, it 
should be the result of the lawyer's role as a faithful advocate and not because of the theory 
that mental illness is a myth. 
83. A final reason to proceed under the assumption that sometimes mental illness is 
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The conventional wisdom in psychiatry, medicine, philosophy, 
and law supports the conclusion that mental illness, physical disa-
bility, and other sources can create the phenomenon known as "in-
competence," which is intended to mean inability to arrive at a 
reasoned decision.84 A person may be competent for some matters 
but incompetent for others; the concept is fluid and dynamic.811 
Persons who are functionally incompetent are entitled to paternal-
ism, because they are likely to suffer harm without having chosen 
that harm.86 Society's approach to children exemplifies this point. 
We readily accept paternalistic treatment of young children. With 
children one can, in theory at least, "determine" lack of compe-
tence by using a rather arbitrary age level. With adults, however, 
the distinction between competence and lack of competence is ob-
viously much harder to define.87 
not a myth is the substantial evidence that diseases associated with aging, and in particular 
Alzheimer's disease, do in fact disrupt the ordinary reasoning processes, preventing the pa-
tient from exercising free choice. See, e.g., Gunn, Mental Impairments in the Elderly: Med-
ical-Legal Assessments, 25 AM. J. GERIATRICS SOC'y 193 (1977); Lange, Geriatric, Psychiat-
ric and Legal Aspects of the Mental State of the Aged, 4 LEGAL MED. Q. 161 (1980); 
Stanley, supra note 67, at 59. The fact that such diseases are physical and involve actual 
organ deterioration makes it difficult to argue that people suffering from them should be 
allowed to behave destructively. 
84. See In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 180-81, 372 A.2d 360 367 (1977); Rogers v. 
Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983); T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCI-
PLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 71-90 (2d ed. 1983); Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 72, at 1465. 
85. See Solnick, supra note 3, at 8; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 312 Mass. 165, 43 N.E.2d 783 
(1942); P. ApPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, supra note 4, at 84-87; S. HERR, S. ARONS & R 
WALLACE, LEGAL RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 25-27 (1983); see also MODEL RULES, 
supra note 9, Rule 1.14 comment 11 1. 
86. See Annas & Densberger, Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment: Autonomy 
vs. Paternalism, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 561, 567-68 (1984); Feinberg, supra note 71, at 112-13; 
Luban, supra note 70, at 465, 473. 
87. The analogies between representing children and representing incompetent adults 
are too prominent to ignore. Although our statutes tend to define competence for children 
by means of the purely arbitrary and actuarial tools of chronological age, even that attempt 
to hide from the problem is not fully successful. See, e.g., IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO 
COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES 8-9 (1980) (lawyers representing mature, independent-
minded children may serve as advocates for the children's desires rather than their best 
interests). 
The role of the lawyer in representing children is enormously difficult and complex. 
See, e.g., Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and 
Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 HARV. CoR-C.L. L. REV. 565 (1976); Guggen-
heim, The Right to be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation 
for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (1984). The suggestions made in this Article, however, 
address situations involving adult clients for several important reasons. The most significant 
reason for treating children differently is that they do not necessarily possess the legal pre-
sumption of competence that adults do. See Guggenheim, supra, at 114-15; Kay & Segel, 
The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEO. 
L.J. 1401, 1410-11 (1973); Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DA-
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Much has been written on the topic of defining and recogniz-
ing competence, yet the concept remains elusive.88 To a large ex-
tent the term remains a legal one, and its boundaries often have 
been drawn by courts.89 It is, however, essentially a matter of psy-
chology90 or perhaps philosophy.91 The most important task for the 
legal standard of competency is' to distinguish effectively between 
foolish, socially deviant, risky, or simply "crazy" choices made 
competently, and comparable choices made incompetently.92 Al-
though incompetent behavior may be restrained, identical compe-
VIS L. REV. 255, 261 (1979); see infra text accompanying notes 96-97. Whereas lawyers ap-
proach adult clients with the prima facie understanding that the client's decisions and pref-
erences are controlling, see, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 9, EC 7-7, the same 
understanding does not necessarily apply to children, see Note, The Mental Hospitalization 
of Children and the Limits of Parental Authority, 88 YALE L.J. 186 (1978) (preadolescent 
children should have no constitutional right to a hearing in involuntary hospitalization pro-
ceedings); Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 76-1 (1976) (lawyer ap-
pointed to represent "child in need of services" should act in child's best interests, even if 
contrary to child's wishes). The distinctions, such as they are, between a lawyer's obligations 
to children and to adults are critical because there is an apparent tendency to treat a ques-
tionably competent adult as if he were a child. That is the practice that this Article 
criticizes. 
88. One group of commentators has described the search for a test of competency as 
"a search for a Holy Grail." Roth, Meisel & Lidz, Tests of Competency lo Consent to Treat-
ment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 283 (1977); see also 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 
supra note 3, at 168-72; Annas & Densberger, supra note 86; Appelbaum, Mirken & Bate-
man, Empirical Assessment of Competency to Consent to Psychiatric Hospitalization, 138 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1170 (1981); Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 72; Green, Judicial Tests of 
Mental Incompetency, 6 Mo. L. REV. 141 (1941); Macklin, Some Problems in Gaining In-
formed Consent from Psychiatric Patients, 31 EMORY L.J. 345 (1982); Miller, Autonomy 
and the Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22 (1981). 
89. See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (1976) 
("Mrs. Candura's decision may be regarded by most as unfortunate, but on the record in 
this case it is not the uninformed decision of a person incapable of appreciating the nat~re 
and consequences of her act"); Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 
(1983). 
90. See P. ApPELBAUM, C. LlDz & A. MEISEL, supra note 4; Roth, Meisel & Lidz, supra 
note 88. 
9!. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 84; Luban, supra note 70; Miller, 
supra note 88. 
92. The "outcome test" (whether the choice itself seems "crazy") of determining com-
petency is based on tautological reasoning and has been rejected by courts and commenta-
tors. See Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424, 432 (D. Utah 1979). The 
court in Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (1976) refused to 
permit doctors to measure competence by the medical rationality of the choice, for the defi-
nition of competence would then be circular. See also Luban, supra note 70, at 466: 
The trick is to come up with a notion of incompetence that is not self-justifying and 
self-serving. Thus, it would clearly be wrong to say something like, "You don't really 
want that. You just think you do because your decisionmaking mechanisms are im-
paired. How do I know? If they weren't impaired you wouldn't want that!" 
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tent behavior may not.93 This distinction fosters and protects au-
tonomy, dignity, and responsibility. A person may have a right to 
choose to harm himself or to forego benefits, but a person who 
harms himself, not by choice but because of illness, should be re-
strained.94 To make this distinction, competence has been defined 
in terms of process and not in terms of result. Most definitions 
focus on the capacity to make choices based on understanding and 
appreciation of the facts and the situation;95 the quality or sub-
stance of the ultimate choice is not a determinant. 
Even with a workable definition of competence, a difficult 
question remains. If we accept paternalism as a reasonably liberal 
approach to preventing harm to those who cannot make reasoned 
decisions, what is the role of the lawyer whose client appears to 
meet that definition? In some ways, the answer to this question 
comprises the remainder of this Article, but some initial thoughts 
seem appropriate. First, substantive law recognizes a presumption 
of competence,96 which generally may not be overcome except by a 
judicial determination.97 Second, again as a matter of law, one 
93. See Feinberg, supra note 71, at 111-12. Some qualification of this statement is 
necessary because there are many lawful paternalistic acts that restrain entirely free, com-
petent choice. We are not free, for instance, to take illicit drugs or, in some states, to ride 
motorcycles without helmets. We may neither hire laypersons to represent us in court, even 
if it saves us money, nor consent to representation by lawyers whose independent profes-
sional judgment is impaired by a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Moore, Conflicts of Interest 
in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Cur-
rent Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEx. L. REV. 211, 232-40 (1982) (favoring paternalism to 
protect clients in some cases). Under certain social and political circumstances, our culture 
accepts paternalism even when it restrains competent choice harmful only to oneself. (There 
are arguments that in each example just given the proscribed conduct also harms third par-
ties, but such arguments are tenuous at best.) 
This Article assumes that such paternalism is not justifiable in lawyering decisions, just 
as it is not in health care decisions. It is the heart of the informed consent doctrine that 
clients may choose their own (lawful) harm. The government's authority to override compe-
tent choice is not generally available to private actors. 
94. This is particularly true if the harm is significant or irreversible. See Dworkin, 
supra note 71, at 123. 
95. See, e.g., 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 169; Appelbaum & 
Roth, supra note 72, at 1467; R. REISNER, supra note 80, at 505. 
96. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 846 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 
1119 (1982); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); 
Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489, 489, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314-15 (1983); In re Moe, 385 
Mass. 555, 567-68, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982); New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 70 
Misc. 2d 944, 945, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1972); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1980); In 
re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623 (1973). 
97. This legal mandate, however, is seldom followed by the medical profession, at least 
in non-life-threatening circumstances. See, e.g., Annas & Densberger, supra note 86, at 564 
("[mlost competence determinations, of course, are not front page news. They are made 
routinely in our nation's hospitals and nursing homes without fanfare or resort to the 
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party generally may not usurp the decisionmaking authority of an-
other without court approval,98 consent of the other party,99 or 
some limited common law or statutory advance authorization.1oo 
Third, an involuntary delegation of decisionmaking authority or a 
judicial determination of incompetence is generally viewed as a se-
rious deprivation of rights, and is often accompanied by procedural 
protections such as the right to a hearing and perhaps to 
counse1.101 
Because a finding of incompetence is equivalent to a depriva-
tion of rights that ordinarily requires court approval, one possible 
response to the question of the lawyer's responsibility to an appar-
ently incompetent client is that the lawyer may not make such a 
determination. Not only must the lawyer remain loyal to her client, 
but in addition no such deprivation should occur in any context 
without judicial approval. Thus, the informed consent doctrine 
should-indeed must-apply and the client's directions must be 
followed. The argument is that a lawyer representing an impaired 
client without a guardian, conservator, or appointed agent is essen-
tially boxed in by the operation of the legal presumption. She can 
neither disregard, nor can she seek to overcome, the presumption 
because to do either would make the lawyer her client's adversary. 
Because she is a lawyer, or more precisely because her relationship 
with her client is a lawyer-client relationship, she must not be per-
mitted to question her client's competence or decisions. She must 
carry out his decisions as long as it is not illegal or unethical to do 
courts") (emphasis added) (citing Brown & Thompson, Nontreatment of Fever in Ex-
tended-Care Facilities, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1246 (1979»; see also 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE 
DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 185-87; Solnick, supra note 3, at 26; Wanzer, The Physician's 
Responsibility Toward Hopelessly III Patients, 310 N.E. J. MED. 955 (1984) ("[a]lthough 
legal determination of incompetence may at times be a matter for court review, this step can 
be safely bypassed when there is unanimity on the part of the physician and others con-
sulted-family and close friends, and psychiatrists, if indicated"). 
98. Guardianship is the ordinary mechanism for lawful substitution of one deci-
sionmaker for and on behalf of another. See Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a 
Critique and a Proposal for Reform, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 601-02 (1981). 
99. An individual may appoint another to manage his affairs by means of a power of 
attorney or similar device. A durable power of attorney survives the disability of the maker. 
See UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY Am:, 8 U.L.A. 74 (1982); MODEL HEALTH CARE CON-
SENT Am: (1982). 
100. Some state statutes and judicial decisions permit limited family consent to medi-
cal treatment for incompetent patients. See Comment, The Role of the Family in Medical 
Decisionmaking for Incompetent Adult Patients: A Historical Perspective and Case Analy-
sis, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 539 (1987); Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment 
Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 985, 993-94 (1984); infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text. 
101. See infra note 190. 
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so. 
This argument is unsatisfactory. Consider the two examples 
above. Adherence to conventional informed consent practice in 
such cases is not only painful to the lawyer but may be morally 
irresponsible. The dilemma is plain: it may be morally wrong to 
intervene, and it may be morally wrong not to intervene. What is 
needed, and what is attempted in the following sections of this Ar-
ticle, is to arrive at some balance between these competing moral 
imperatives. Absent a significant stride in moral philosophy,102 the 
conflict cannot be neatly resolved. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FROM THE PROFESSION 
Although the issue of informed consent for the incompetent 
client has not been addressed in the legal context to the same ex-
tent as in the medical context, the profession has offered some 
guidance for lawyers who find themselves representing impaired 
clients. While the doctrine of informed consent plays a minor ex-
plicit role in these formulations, they do contain an implicit resolu-
tion of the client-centeredness/paternalism tension. This section 
first reviews the ABA's ethical standards and then the trend of 
case law and commentator analysis to explain how the informed 
consent considerations have been sacrificed to paternalism in those 
forums. 
A. Suggestions From the ABA 
The American Bar Association has recognized the difficulty in 
applying conventional approaches to client decisionmaking to cli-
ents who are less able to make competent decisions. The Code of 
Professional Responsibility ("Code" or "Model Code") deals with 
this issue obliquely. The more recent Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct ("Rules" or "Model Rules") attempt a more forthright 
approach to the problem. The guidance offered by each, however, 
either is too incoherent and ambiguous to be meaningful or is un-
justified in its delegation of authority to the lawyer. 
102. See Macklin, supra note 88, at 373 ("[t]he person capable of resolving the theo-
retical conflict in ethics that underlies disputes [between autonomy and beneficence] arising 
at the applied level would make a significant contribution to twentieth century moral 
philosophy"). 
lient fully on 
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questions. First, one might wonder whether the decisions that 
must be made by the client under EC 7-7 are those that the lawyer 
is prohibited from making under EC 7-12; if so, the lawyer's obli-
gation to competent and incompetent clients is precisely the 
same.110 This conclusion seems nonsensical given the inclusion of 
EC 7-12 as a set of different standards for representing incompe-
tent clients. A more sensible construction is that EC 7-12 permits 
the lawyer to make decisions that otherwise would be "exclusively" 
for the client under EC 7-7. The decisions that a lawyer may not 
make even under EC 7-12 presumably include those that would 
require nondelegable action by the client, e.g., making a will, vot-
ing, or oath-taking.lll The Code does not indicate the basis for giv-
ing the lawyer power to make decisions that otherwise are exclu-
sively for the client; one would assume that the drafters relied on 
principles of agency and implied consent.ll2 However, the reasona-
bleness of assuming such a delegation of authority is very 
questionable.113 
It is also unclear what the drafters mean by the "interests" of 
the client. As discussed below, a "best interests" standard may be 
distinguished from a "substituted judgment" standard as well as 
whether a particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable and as to the prospects 
of success on appeal, but it is for the client to decide what plea should be entered and 
whether an appeal should be taken. 
110. For instance, under EC 7-7, only the client can decide whether to waive an affirm-
ative defense. If that is the type of decision that is beyond the scope of the lawyer under EC 
7-12, then the lawyer has the same authority whether the client is competent or incompe-
tent. This hardly seems logical given the Model Code's special treatment of incapacitated 
clients. But see D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 1, at 205-06 n.8 (EC 7-12 does not contem-
plate lawyer decisionmaking on issues reserved to the client by EC 7-7); COMM. ON PROF. 
ETHICS OF THE Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, INQUIRY REFERENCE 81-32 
(same). 
111. See Note, supra note 100, at 1009. 
112. For example, the drafters might have assumed that the creation of the attorney-
client relationship implies delegation of authority in cases of incompetence. See Maute, 
supra note 1, at 1089-92; Spiegel, supra note 1, at 77-85 (citing Parsons, Research With 
Human Subjects and the "Professional Complex," 98 DAEDALUS 325 (1969»; Shores Co. v. 
Iowa Chem. Co., 222 Iowa 347, 268 N.W. 581 (1936) (implicit authority for attorney to waive 
jury trial); Rose v. Oliveira, 115 R.I. 277, 287, 342 A.2d 601, 606 (1975) (attorney authorized 
to take necessary legal and professional actions by virtue of representation); cf. Wainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93-94 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (conduct of trial including 
decisions whether to make certain objections is delegated to attorney). 
113. See Spiegel, supra note 1, at 77-85 (attorney-client relationship does not give rise 
to any implied decisionmaking authority). Compare the medical model, in which entering 
into a relationship is insufficient to imply consent to any particular treatment, however ben-
eficial. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 35, at 225 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 
782 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972». 
No.3] LAWYER DECISIONMAKING 543 
an "advocacy" standard.ll4 Under EC 7-12 should a lawyer in court 
with an incompetent client act according to what the client would 
have wanted (substituted judgment), what the lawyer thinks best 
for the client (best interests), or what the law most allows (advo-
cacy)? The Model Code does not answer this question. Ill> One 
thing does seem clear-the lawyer should not do what the client 
wants unless it happens to coincide with the approach chosen by 
the lawyer. 
Finally, the reason for restricting the lawyer's power to over-
ride her client's wishes to in-court representation is not at all ap-
parent. The Code does not offer any guidance to lawyers represent-
ing incompetents in non-litigation or pre-litigation contexts 
(except, perhaps, to follow EC 7-7). Each of the possible reasons 
for drawing this distinction-court representation is more impor-
tant, keeping client confidences is more important in court lest the 
judge be prejudiced, or implied consent is more justifiable in litiga-
tion-cannot withstand scrutiny.1l6 
Thus, the Model Code is generally paternalistic, at least in the 
litigation context. In fact, in that context it delegates authority to 
lawyers quite generously. Overall, however, it raises more questions 
than it answers, most notably regarding non-court activity, and 
114. See infra notes 138-53 and accompanying text; Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy 
Decisionmaking For Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. REV. 386, 393-404 (1981); Frolik, supra note 
98, at 606-25, 636-37. 
115. The most probable construction of EC 7-12's language is that the lawyer should 
perform a "best interests" analysis and act accordingly. See, e.g.,VA. STATE BAR LEGAL ETH-
ICS COMM. LEO 570 (1984) (lawyer to act "in the best interest of the client"); STATE BAR OF 
MICH., COMM. ON PROF. & JUD. ETHICS, INF. OP. CI-1055 (1984) (same). For further discussion 
of that approach, see infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
116. Although litigation affects important client rights and is a central part of lawyer-
ing, it is not the predominant context of lawyer-client interaction. It is not more important, 
therefore, to protecting client interests than are non-litigation functions such as negotiation 
or planning. See, e.g., L. BROWN & E. DAUER, supra note 42, at xix; Menkel-Meadow, To-
ward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. 
REV. 754, 768 (1984); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979). 
The Code's apparent limitation of de facto authority to the courtroom might be justi-
fied by the need for confidentiality vis-a-vis the judge. The Code drafters might argue that if 
the lawyer's choice is between acting as de facto guardian and revealing the client's disabil-
ity to the court, the lawyer must avoid the revelation. Although this is both a long-standing 
professional concern in other contexts, such as whisUeblowing, see Note, The Attorney's 
Duty to Reveal a Client's Intended Future Criminal Conduct, 1984 DUKE L.J. 582, and an 
important concern in this context, it simply does not follow that revealing the client's disa-
bility violates the client's rights any less than does usurping the client's decisionmaking 
authority. Nor is it clear that disclosure of client confidences outside the courtroom is of any 
less concern. 
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otherwise it is close to meaningless in its guidance to the practicing 
bar.1l7 The propriety of and justification for its implied delegation 
of decisionmaking authority to lawyers is discussed below.u8 
2. The Model Rules-The Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct treat this thorny issue much more directly. The Rules gener-
ally follow the approach of EC 7-12 but offer important differences 
as well. Model Rule 1.14 contains two separate and potentially in-
congruous mandates for lawyers representing clients whose "ability 
to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the 
representation is impaired."1l9 Rule 1.14(a) first requires that "the 
lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal cli-
ent-lawyer relationship with the client."12o The Comment to this 
Rule makes two observations on this point, neither supporting the 
interpretation that the client should make the decisions. First, the 
lawyer should continue to treat a disabled client with respect,121 
and second, the presence of a guardian or legal representative does 
not remove the lawyer's general obligation to maintain communi-
cations with the client.122 The Comment further notes, in an inter-
pretation for which there is no apparent authority in the language 
of the Rule,123 that if there is no guardian or legal representative, 
117. For similar sentiments, see D. Herman, Representing the Respondent in Civil 
Commitment Proceedings, ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Monograph Series 20 
(1985). 
118. See infra notes 232-60 and accompanying text. 
119. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14(a). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. comment 11 2. 
122. Id. 
123. Compare Rule 1.14 with the comment. The Rule makes two points: (1) the lawyer 
should maintain a normal attorney-client relationship with the disabled client; and (2) the 
lawyer may seek a guardian or "take other protective action" when the lawyer reasonably 
believes that the client cannot adequately act in his own interest. It may be argued that the 
de facto guardianship language in the comment obtains its authority from the "other protec-
tive action" language of the Rule. The ordinary interpretation of that language, however, is 
"protective services," which generally means intervention by some agency or person author-
ized to assist and protect those at risk. See, e.g., Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly: 
Commitment, Guardianship, and Alternatives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569 (1972). 
The comments to the Model Rules are intended to serve merely as interpretive guide-
lines. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9, preamble ("[t]he comments are intended as guides to 
interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative"); see also A KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS 
IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 21 (1984) (the Comments often "strike out on their own," 
and the Model Rules do not satisfactorily resolve questions about the enforceability of the 
Comments); cf. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REV. 445 (1984) 
(discussing a Comment going far beyond language of Rule). 
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"the lawyer often must act as de facto guardian. "l24 
Thus, from the Comment interpreting the ambiguous language 
of the Rule, it is fair to conclude that maintaining, "as far as rea-
sonably possible," a normal client-lawyer relationship does not 
mean adhering to normal notions of informed consent.125 
The second part of the .Rule permits the lawyer to seek the 
appointment of a guardian, but only when the lawyer reasonably 
believes that the client cannot adequately act in his own inter-
est.126 This suggestion, however, is not mandatory.127 Thus, in light 
of the Comment, it is fair to assume that the lawyer has the discre-
tion to choose either to act as de facto guardian or to seek appoint-
ment of a proper, authorized guardian, except that seeking ap-_ 
pointment of a guardian is restricted to certain more serious 
disabilities.128 
To the extent the Rule encourages appointment and use of au-
thorized legal representatives, it is consistent with the traditional 
124. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14 comment 11 2. 
125. Even though the Rule retreats from requiring client decisionmaking, its attempt 
to increase client participation in decisionmaking (a fair inference from its recommendation 
of maintaining normal communication between lawyer and client) is laudable. It has been 
shown that increased participation leads to greater client satisfaction. See D. ROSENTHAL, 
supra note I, at 169; Maute, supra note I, at 1051 n.2. 
126. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14(b). 
127. The language of the Rule is "A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian 
•.•. " [d. (emphasis added). The preamble to the Model Rules states that certain rules 
"generally cast in the term 'may,' are permissive and define areas under the Rules in which 
the lawyer has professional discretion. No disciplinary action should be taken when the law-
yer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion." MODEL RULES, supra 
note 9, scope. 
This discretionary language replaced the mandatory language of prior drafts. The earli-
est public draft of Rule 1.14(b) read as follows: "(b) A lawyer shall secure the appointment 
of a guardian or other legal representative, or seek a protective order with respect to a cli-
ent, when doing so is necessary in the client's best interest." MODEL RULES, supra note 9, 
Rule 1.14(b) (Discussion Draft 1980) (emphasis added). The proposed final draft replaced 
the last clause with "only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot ade-
quately communicate or exercise judgment in the client-lawyer relationship." MODEL RULES, 
supra note 9, Rule 1.14(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (emphasis added). Thus, it limited 
the application of the mandatory language. The revised final draft replaced "shall" with 
"may." MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14(b) (Revised Final Draft 1982). Interestingly, 
even when the language of Rule 1.14(b) had "shall," the Comment stated that "[ilf the 
person has no guardian or legal representative, the lawyer often must act as de facto guard-
ian." MODEL RULES supra note 9, Rule 1.14(b) comment (Discussion Draft 1980, Proposed 
Final Draft 1981). 
128. The lawyer's discretion to seek a guardian or to take "other protective action" 
may be exercised "only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot ade-
quately act in the client's own interest." MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14(b) (empha-
sis added). Note that the term "interest" is used, raising the same problems caused by the 
use of that term in EC 7-7. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15. 
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approach to proxy decisionmaking. To the extent it permits ad hoc 
decisionmaking by the lawyer without either consent or court ap-
proval, the Rule reincorporates the tension that has received so 
much attention in the medical field,129 but it offers no meaningful 
assistance regarding how to resolve the tension in practice. In a 
technical but perhaps significant way, it also violates the law by 
authorizing action in the absence of direct or proxy consent.130 As 
noted below, this lawlessness is widespread in the professions and 
elsewhere. Some argue that it is entirely inevitable and even 
proper.131 
The Comment to Rule 1.14 also raises a concern about the 
lawyer seeking appointment of a guardian by noting that "disclo-
sure of the client's disability can adversely affect the client's inter-
ests," for example, by leading to involuntary commitment proceed-
ings.132 A related fact not mentioned by the Comment but implied 
in the example, is that disclosure contravenes the lawyer's duty to 
129. In the medical field the question of who will make decisions for incapacitated 
patients has been debated vigorously without any coherent or generally accepted resolution. 
See, e.g., 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 182-88; Buchanan, Medical 
Paternalism or Legal Imperialism: Not the Only Alternatives for Handling Saikewicz-type 
Cases, 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 97,105-06 (1979); Gauvey, Leviton, Shuger & Sykes, Informed and 
Substitute Consent to Health Care Procedures: A Proposal for State Legislation, 15 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 431, 445 (1978) [hereinafter Proposal for State Legislation]; Meisel, supra note 
3, at 476; Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Re-
cent Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 461 (1980); Note, supra note 100, at 994. The 
themes that emerge from this debate form the basis for analyzing the lawyer's role in mak-
ing decisions for incapacitated clients in section IV of this Article. Given the similarity of 
the two professions, it is disquieting that this issue has received so little attention from 
scholars focusing on legal ethics. Although the life-and-death nature of medical choices cer-
tainly invites debate on the physician's role, the absence of that element from most legal 
choices does not relieve lawyers of the same ethical dilemma. 
130. The presumption of competence, see supra note 96 and accompanying text, can 
easily be construed to mean that all persons' are legally competent to make decisions until 
the presumption has been overcome in a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 
F.2d 836, 846 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); Rogers v. Com-
missioner, 390 Mass. 489, 498, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314-15 (1983); cf. P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A 
MEISEL, supra note 4, at 90 ("in theory," a finding of incompetence requires adjudication). 
Any third party usurpation of authority without judicial approval or prior consent violates 
this principle. See Proposal for State Legislation, supra note 129, at 440-41. Yet such viola-
tions occur continually, sometimes without any acknowledgement of the legal impediment. 
See, e.g., 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 185-87; Bedell & Delbanco, 
Choices About Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in the Hospital: When Do Physicians Talk 
With Patients?, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 955, 956 (1984). When the legal bar is acknowledged, 
it is derided for its impracticality and seeming naivete. See, e.g., Proposal for State Legisla-
tion, supra note 129, at 440-41; Note, supra note 100, at 992-94. 
131. See Proposal for State Legislation, supra note 100, at 440-41; see also infra text 
accompanying notes 229-30. 
132. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14 comment 'if 5. 
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keep client confidences except in a few narrow instances.l33 The 
Comment's only response to this, the heart of the dilemma faced 
by the lawyer representing an incompetent client without a guard-
ian, is the following bromide: "The lawyer's position in such cases 
is an unavoidably difficult one. "l34 The Comment is correct that 
the position is difficult; in fact, it is plainly far more difficult and 
wrought with internal contradictions than either the Rule or the 
Comment is willing to recognize. The Comment also is correct that 
the difficulty is unavoidable. It is in fact a classic moral di-
lemma-each option available to the lawyer has conflicting moral 
considerations.l3G The Rule should assist in resolving this dilemma, 
but it fails. The Rule seems to sacrifice confidentiality and loyalty, 
as well as the concomitant "adverse [e]ffect"l36 on the client's in-
terest, in favor of a principle of benign paternalism without ex-
plaining why or when the Rule is triggered. Section IV will subject 
these competing considerations to analysis and test Rule 1.14's del-
egation of authority to the lawyer. 
B. Suggestions From Courts and Commentators: Why the "Ad-
vocacy" vs. "Best Interest" Choice Fails 
Much has been written concerning the lawyer's relationship 
with the disabled or mentally impaired clients in the context of 
commitment or guardianship proceedings.l37 The question that 
133. Id. Rule 1.6; MODEL CODE, supra note 9, Canon 4. Seeking such help for a client 
inevitably breaches the duty of confidentiality. See Devine, The Ethics of Representing the 
Disabled Client: Does Model Rule 1.14 Adequately Resolve the Best Interests/Advocacy 
Dilemma?, 49 Mo. L. REV. 493, 500-02 (1984). 
134. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14 comment 11 5. 
135. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 84, at 4 (moral dilemmas arise 
when one can appeal to moral considerations for taking each of two opposing courses of 
action). 
136. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14(b). 
137. See, e.g., Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil 
Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 MISS. L.J. 43, 46-49 (1974); Baron, 
Botsford & Cole, Live Organ & Tissue Transplants From Minor Donors in Massachusetts, 
55 B.U.L. REV. 159 (1975) (arguing that adversary system will not operate properly if minor 
does not have a zealous advocate); Brakel, The Role of the Lawyer in the Mental Health 
Field, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 467, 467; Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the 
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REV. 424, 446-57 (1966); Devine, supra note 
133, at 495-96; Elkins, Legal Representation of the Mentally Ill, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 157 
(1979); Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information Service: An Experiment in Due 
Process, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 405, 439-41 (1971); R. JANOPAUL. PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALIZING 
THE MENTALLY ILL 13-14 (Am. Bar Found. Res. Memorandum Ser. No. 31, 1962); Johnson, 
Due Process in Involuntary Civil Commitment and Incompetency Adjudication Proceed-
ings: Where Does Colorado Stand?, 46 DEN. u.L. REV. 516, 535-37, 565-67 (1969); Mick-
enberg, The Silent Clients: Legal and Ethical Considerations in Representing Severely and 
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tends to arise in this context is a difficult personal one for the law-
yer: Should the lawyer act as an "advocate" for her client/3s or 
should her actions be guided by the "best interests" of the pro-
posed ward?139 The choice is a real one. Under the advocacy 
model, the lawyer does not make personal judgments about the 
wisdom of a full and vigorous defense but raises all reasonable ar-
guments and employs all available tactics to challenge the pro-
posed action.140 While this approach most closely adheres to the 
professional ethic of "zealous advocacy,"141 it also leads to some 
disquieting results: the dangerous patient is permitted to remain 
free, or the desperately ill patient is denied needed treatment.142 In 
contrast, under the "best interests" model the lawyer defends ag-
gressively only if it is in the ward's interest to avoid the proposed 
commitment, protective service, or the like.143 Proponents of this 
approach argue that it serves no p.urpose to employ skill, cunning, 
and strategy to keep badly needed help from a sick person.144 
Even though this choice may be difficult to make personally, 
Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 STAN. L. REV. 625 (1979); Morris, Conservatorship for 
the "Gravely Disabled": California's Nondeclaration of Nonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 201 (1978); Comment, A Constitutional Right to Court Appointed Counsel for the 
Involuntarily Committed Mentally Ill: Beyond the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 5 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 64, 67-69 (1973); Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: 
A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1541-42 (1975); Developments in the 
Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974). 
138. See Mickenberg, supra note 137, at 632-33; Note, supra note 137, at 1562. 
139. See MODEL CODE, supra note 9, EC 7-9 ("a lawyer should always act in a manner 
consistent with the best interests of his client"); id. EC 7-12 (lawyer representing disabled 
client must "act with care to safeguard and advance the interests of his client"); People v. 
Bolden, 99 Cal. App. 3d 375, 160 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1979) (lawyer who believes that client is not 
acting in his own best interests may overrule client's instructions); Johnson, supra note 137, 
at 565-67. For a comparison of the two models, see Herman, supra note 117. 
140. See In re Quesnell, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 236, 517 P.2d 568, 576 (1973); Frolik, supra 
note 98, at 633-37; Note, supra note 137, at 1561. 
141. See MODEL CODE, supra note 9, EC 7-1, DR 7-101. The 1983 Model Rules do not 
refer to "zeal" per se, but it is apparent that they impose the same duty of zealous advocacy. 
See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.2(a) (lawyer must abide by client's decisions 
regarding objectives of the representation). 
142. See Stone, The Myth of Advocacy, 30 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY (1979) 
(cited in A. KAUFMAN, supra note 123, at 353-59) (commitment process is nonadversarial so 
advocacy obtains unfair and unwarranted results); Note, supra note 137, at 1559. 
143. There are few actual proponents of the best interests model, although even those 
writers who reject it recognize its attractiveness, at least at some level. See Note, supra note 
137, at 1552-53. Some commentators, however, have espoused this approach. See, e.g., John-
son, supra note 137, at 565-66; Stone, supra note 142, at 819; cf. Genden, supra note 87, at 
588-89 (best interests approach advocated for children); Paulsen, Juvenile Courts and the 
Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527 (1968) (same). 
144. See Stone, supra note 142, at 354; Traffert, Dying With Their Rights On, 130 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 104 (1973). 
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its resolution among courts and writers has been rather uniform. 
Most favor advocacy. The most significant reason is the belief that 
a lawyer using a more selective approach usurps the function of the 
judge or jury by deciding her client's fate. 145 Judges and commen-
tators also argue that it would be paternalistic for a lawyer to de-
cide what is best for her client. Such paternalism, they argue, is 
unjustified. 146 
Might the advocacy model serve as a prescriptive (and norma-
tive) heuristic for dealing with the questionably competent client 
in all contexts? The model has been justified in several settings as 
that most consistent with principles of informed consent,147 and 
thus adherence to it might best serve all the competing concerns. 
The answer appears to be no. Analysis shows that this model is not 
necessarily fully congruent with informed consent. It may be justi-
fied in the context of appointed lawyers representing clients in lib-
erty-threatening circumstances, but in ordinary civil contexts the 
model does not serve as well. First, it is apparent that the advocacy 
model reflects informed consent only if the client has chosen to 
145. See In re Quesnell, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568, 574-76 (1973) (en banc); 
Frolik, supra note 98, at 634-35. In Quesnell the Washington Supreme Court vacated a civil 
commitment order and laid down guidelines for attorneys representing allegedly committa-
ble persons. The court held that such attorneys must act as advocates and not as disinter-
ested guardians. The lawyer must "submit to the court all relevant defenses or legal claims 
his client may have." Quesnell, 517 P.2d at 576 (quoting In re Estate of Manning, 85 Neb. 
60, 122 N.W.2d 711, 713 (1909». The court stated correctly that "in the absence of knowing 
consent of the person alleged to be mentally iII, a [lawyer] may not waive any fundamental 
right relevant to the ... commitment proceeding." Quesnell, 517 P.2d at 578. In Quesnell it 
was apparent that no such waiver had occurred. 
Quesnell raises two additional issues. First, the case concerned an attoney serving as 
guardian ad litem, a role even less clear than the lawyer's. See Baron, Assuring "Detached 
But Passionate Investigation and Decision": The Role of Guardians ad Litem in Saikewicz-
type Cases, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 111 (1978) (discussing roles of both guardians ad litem and, 
by extension, lawyers). Quesnell, however, has been interpreted as if the court were address-
ing the lawyer's role. See, e.g., Devine, supra note 133, at 495-96. Second, the court did not 
address how, if at all, the lawyer's role is limited by instructions from the mentally iII client 
to waive rights or defenses. The decision implies that the lawyer would be bound by such a 
waiver only if it were a "knowing" waiver. Quesnell, 517 P.2d at 578. A court sitting in a 
commitment proceeding might inquire into the client's capacity to waive the right. Cf. Mas-
sachusetts Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 80-4 (1980) (lawyer must remain as 
appointed counsel for mentally iII client even if client "fires" her; lawyer must also advocate 
against client's voluntary commitment if lawyer doubts voluntariness) [hereinafter Mass. 
Ethics Op. 80-4]. 
146. See, e.g., Andalman & Chambers, supra note 137, at 48 ("best interests" ap-
proach is "paternalistic attitude [that] reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the law-
yer's role in our system of law"). 
147. See, e.g., In re Quesnell, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973) (en banc) (adver-
sary approach is based on client consent); Frolik, supra note 98 (advocacy is following cli-
ent's wishes); Note, supra note 137, at 1562. 
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litigate aggressively. If the client chooses another approach, does 
the model permit nonadvocacy? While most authorities sidestep 
the question/48 some expressly require advocacy even when the cli-
ent, whose competence is the very subject of the proceedings, 
chooses nonadvocacy.149 For instance, one commentator has argued 
that the proper role for an attorney whose client instructs her not 
to resist a guardianship is "clear: defend the client from an unlaw-
ful guardian."lllo This suggestion supports the proposition that the 
148. For example, in Quesnell the Washington Supreme Court assumed implied con-
sent to full advocacy unless the client knowingly waives that approach. 517 P.2d at 578. The 
opinion presumably requires nonadvocacy if the client so demands, but full advocacy is the 
"default" option. If the client does or says nothing, the lawyer's responsibility is to be an 
advocate. This makes some sense given that any other option would be more paternalistic 
because it would require the lawyer, rather than the court, to determine the client's rights. 
See also Note, supra note 137, at 1562 n.84 (lawyer must abide by client's instructions, but 
if there are none, lawyer must serve as advocate). 
149. See Frolik, supra note 98, at 636-37. 
150. Id. Professor Frolik addresses the four possible scenarios of client choice in a 
guardianship proceeding: (1) a (seemingly) competent client instructs his lawyer to defend; 
(2) such a client instructs his lawyer not to defend; (3) a (seemingly) incompetent client 
instructs his lawyer to defend; and (4) such a client instructs his lawyer not to defend. Id. at 
636. He concludes that in either instance of instructions to defend, the lawyer must follow 
the client's wishes. In either case of instructions not to defend, Frolik concludes that de-
fense is required nevertheless. Frolik observes that "[clounsel is not empowered either by 
training or law to decide that his client is· incompetent or that society is best served by the 
appointment of a guardian." Id. at 637. This explanation is ironic: unless the lawyer is de-
ciding that the client is incompetent, what reason does she have for disregarding his instruc-
tions? If Frolik's solution is justified, it is not because of the lawyer's inability to decide 
competence, as he claims, but rather because of the independent role of appointed counsel 
in parens patriae proceedings. See Baron, Professional Ethical Issues Confronting the 
Bench and Bar in "Mental Disability" Cases, in GUARDIANSHIPS, CONSERVATORSHIPS, CML 
COMMITMENT AND RIGHT OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS 73-82 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 
1982); Mass. Ethics Op. 80-4, supra note 145 (lawyer must remain as appointed counsel for 
mentally ill client even if client "fires" her; lawyer must also advocate against client's volun-
tary commitment if lawyer doubts voluntariness). 
This is the only reasonable justification for Frolik's conclusion that the lawyer must 
defend even a competent client who instructs her not to defend. His argument that the 
client may obtain the same results through other means (e.g., a power of attorney), Frolik, 
supra note 98, at 636, is simply more paternalism. Why force a client to accept a less restric-
tive solution if he voluntarily and competently chooses a more restrictive one? 
As noted above, Frolik differentiates between competent and incompetent clients. He 
does not explain, however, how these labels attach. Although he implies that they are the 
lawyer's conclusions, that implication seems ruled out by his insistence that the process 
remain pure from lawyer judgment of competence. See id. 
Another explanation that Frolik relies on is that "it would be unethical for counsel to 
cooperate in the appointment of a guardian for a competent person." Id. at 636. This is 
insupportable. No standard of ethics requires an attorney to defend a claim that her client 
competently chooses not to defend, and there is no reason to believe that guardianship is 
any different from any other civil proceeding in this respect. Thus, the only possible justifi-
cation for Frolik's conclusion is the role-specific ethical mandate for appointed counsel to 
defend regardless of client choice. 
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advocacy approach is not an informed consent approach. The ra-
tionale for the advocacy model in fact rests less on informed con-
sent considerations than on the need to assure that state imposed 
restrictions on liberty are accomplished only with all the protec-
tions of the adversary system.151 It is for this reason that the model 
seems less inappropriate when applied to appointed counsel, whose 
role may be situation ally defined.152 To the extent that informed 
consent is a factor, the system presumes that competent clients 
would resist the petitioner; a choice not to resist is implicit evi-
dence of incompetence.153 
In ordinary civil matters involving partially functioning cli-
ents, the advocacy model makes little sense. In such cases the 
choices are altered significantly because client choice can neither 
be so readily predicted nor its direction so readily presumed. The 
real difficulty in civil cases arises when the client chooses not to 
defend or assert his rights, and the consequence of this decision 
(or, not infrequently, mere nondecision) is considerable harm to 
the client. In such cases, "advocacy" does not equate with anti-
paternalism; in fact, it equates precisely with paternalism. If one 
wishes to advise attorneys in such cases to "oppose the opponent," 
one may not do so in the guise of adhering to informed consent. 
Other justifications must be found or the advice must be changed. 
The examples that introduced section II demonstrate this 
point. With Mr. H in the first example, the "best interests" and 
"advocacy" approaches collapse into uniformity, with the under-
standing that to be an advocate here is to defy the client's express 
instructions. Advocacy might make "objective" sense, but the law-
yer must somehow overcome the problem created by an absence of 
151. See Baron, Botsford & Cole, supra note 137; Baron, supra note 150, at 80-82. 
152. See Baron, supra note 150, at 76 (noting special role of appointed counsel); ct. In 
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (importance of adversary process to assure that both sides are 
heard). 
153. It is more likely that the compliant object of commitment proceedings is not in 
fact consenting to commitment but simply does not understand the options. The theory is 
this: If the ward is incompetent, opposing commitment should cause no harm if the system 
is working (and the lawyer must assume that the system does work). If the ward is compe-
tent, the attorney's advocacy will establish that fact and the involuntary commitment will 
not be ordered. Although this contradicts the client's instructions, it may not be troubling 
(1) because voluntary commitment is often available, and (2) these circumstances are so rare 
as to be virtually nonexistent. A more realistic scenario would involve a competent client 
desiring involuntary commitment because of financial or emotional inability to request vol-
untary admission. Under these circumstances even appointed counsel could ethically agree 
to commitment. 
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consent.1154 With Mr. M in the second example, the choice is even 
more difficult because it is unclear how one might most effectively 
"advocate," and the best way to further the clients "interests" is 
equally uncertain.lI5I5 The choice of either model leaves the hard 
questions unresolved. 
The dilemma created by this kind of civil representation is 
thus much more complex and variegated than that facing ap-
pointed counsel. As we turn in the next section to consider the 
choices available in the civil context, no model will emerge. What 
can be accomplished is an elucidation of the considerations and 
ethical mandates that impinge on the representation, and an as-
sessment of how each option might fare under those considerations 
and mandates. 
IV. BEYOND INFORMED CONSENT: ASSESSMENT OF THE LAWYER'S 
CHOICES 
The discussion up to this point has disclosed some real confu-
sion emanating from the profession on this topic. If a theme does 
emerge, it is one of paternalism, and of shifting authority from cli-
ent to lawyer when the lawyer believes such a shift is appropriate. 
The Code and the Rules permit various forms of intervention, 
while the case law on involuntary commitment encourages pater-
nalistic advocacy. Notably, however, the profession seeks to adhere 
to the underlying ideology of informed consent while permitting 
exceptions to that ~octrine. This is especially true in commitment-
type cases that stress the client's right to decide. 
This section will seek to make more explicit the tension be-
tween informed consent and paternalism within the professional 
directives. By identifying the concrete choices available to a lawyer 
facing client incapacity, this discussion will show that certain op-
tions fall at one end of the informed consent/paternalism axis 
while other options fit elsewhere. The discussion will also make ex-
plicit the value choices that are implicit in the various lawyer be-
154. Because all lawyering is consensual, any action taken on behalf of Mr. H must 
rest on authority obtained from some source. One might assume that the authority for ap-
pointed counsel to act in the absence of express consent from the client comes from the 
appointing court. 
155. The difficulty of both examples is crystallized by the lack of any court to which 
the lawyer can turn. Compare the resolution of the lawyer's dilemma in the commitment 
setting: "The court, which may draw upon expert advice of its choice, is the only proper 
party to decide what is in the ill person's and the public's best interest. The judge, not the 
attorney, must make this decision." Andalman & Chambers, supra note 137, at 48. 
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haviors discussed, and will critique those value choices. 
Considering again the two examples that appeared earlier, we 
can develop a rather complete universe of choices available to a 
lawyer representing a client whose decisionmaking capacity shows 
signs of diminishing. The choices appear to be limited to the 
following: 
(1) Follow the client's wishes as if he were any other competent 
client. 
(2) Seek a guardian for him, either directly or by referral to an-
other to accomplish that purpose. 
(3) Rely on next of kin as proxy decisionmaker, but without court 
approval of that designation. 
(4) Act as de facto guardian, which means the lawyer acts without 
actual authority. 1GB 
(5) Deviate from the conventional interaction by seeking to per-
suade the client to permit the lawyer to do what the lawyer 
believes a more "realistic" client would choose to do. 
(6) Withdraw. 
These options seemingly exhaust the universe of choices open to a 
lawyer, although concededly different possibilities exist within 
each option. The precise nature of each possibility affects the ac-
ceptability of the choice.157 The remainder of this Article will out-
line some of the considerations involved in any attempt to choose 
how to proceed with Mr. H or Mr. M. Once again, we will find that 
easy or right answers are scarce. 
A. The Antipaternalism Option: Treat the Client as Competent 
The first option to consider is nondiscrimination between 
competent and questionably competent clients. Under this option 
the lawyer adopts the same informed consent approach in each 
case, assuming conclusively that the client is capable of making an 
informed choice. To some, this option might be the most coherent 
because it fosters values that are important to prevailing notions of 
156. This description of option (4) assumes that without court approval or client con-
sent the lawyer is not empowered by law to act on her own. It also assumes that state 
adoption of the MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14, would not create this otherwise 
nonexistent authority. 
157. For example, the range of conduct that might constitute action without consent is 
quite broad, from speaking to the client's physician about the client's capabilities, to filing a 
lawsuit on his behalf, to getting his story on the front page of the local newspaper. The 
persuasion option also encompasses lesser and greater degrees of coercion. The propriety of 
the lawyer's conduct, therefore, may depend more on its degree within a category than on 
the category itself. 
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morality and professional responsibility. To test this, let us explore 
this approach in the context of Mr. H. The following considera-
tions favor this option: First, Mr. H has a strong autonomy interest 
in making his own choices free from paternalism.158 Any option in-
volving paternalism or intervention devalues that autonomy by 
substituting the decision of another for that of Mr. H. Because no 
other person can fully recreate or understand Mr. H's values,159 
that intervention runs the risk-perhaps a great risk-of being 
wrong. Further, more lawyer intervention in this setting has added 
unacceptable consequences. It encourages continued lawyer pater-
nalism, which is a serious professional problem.16o It cannot be di-
vorced from lawyer bias and conflict of interest {and thus a lawyer 
might intervene because of the substance or quality of the decision 
rather than because of a faulty decisionmaking process, the defini-
tion of incompetence).161 Often the intervention itself will result in 
breaches of loyalty and confidentiality, contrary to established 
principles of professional ethics. 162 
One can present a coherent and principled argument, there-
fore, in favor of doing nothing, if that is the client's choice, not-
withstanding harmful consequences for the client. Although this 
argument has validity in many, perhaps most, instances of per-
ceived client irrationality, one must recognize instances in which 
adopting such an approach would be ethically unacceptable. If one 
accepts the premise that some individuals suffer from forms of 
mental illness and incapacity that cause behavior inconsistent with 
their values {values that they held when competent and that they 
158. See Shultz, supra note 35, at 219-20; Wasserstrom, supra note 29, at 16-19. 
159. See Simon, supra note 29, at 41 (lawyers never adequately understand client val-
ues); Spiegel, supra note I, at 101; cf. Note, supra note 34, at 1546-47 (physicians do not 
know their patients' values). Robert Veach has pointed out society's tendency to "generalize 
expertise," and to assume that a professional can be relied on for decisions beyond his train-
ing. This fallacy creates the incorrect impression that professionals will make more accurate 
decisions than their clients. R. VEACH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 112 
(1976) (cited in S. JORDAN, supra note 3, at 84-88); see also Veach, The Generalization of 
Expertise, 1 THE HASTINGS REP. 29 (1973). 
160. See authorities cited supra note 29. This is really a "slippery slope" argument, 
for it applies even if the present intervention would be justified. 
161. See supra text accompanying note 95. The concerns about a professional's inabil-
ity to place her patient's or client's interests above her own have been expressed in philo-
sophical terms ("man's propensity to overreach a joint venturer"), in psychological terms 
(the ideology of help-giving is so strong that professionals feel obliged to help, see T. SZASZ, 
supra note 75, at 187-88), and practical terms (experts must always rely in part on personal 
preference to fill gaps in information). See Note, supra note 34, at 1573-74 n.1l9. 
162. See infra text accompanying notes 191-208. 
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continue to hold),IS3 one can accept the moral imperative to inter-
vene to protect them from the consequences of their actions;ls4 Un-
less one believes that all forms of commitment, involuntary guardi-
anship, protective services, or comparable intervention are 
unacceptable because of their infringement on liberty and auton-
omy/SII one can accept the notion-or at least the theory-of be-
nevolent intervention. Indeed, the refusal to intervene in extreme 
cases of distraught self-destructive behavior (the most obvious ex-
ample is a depressed individual's suicide attempt)1ss is arguably 
morally wrong.lS7 . 
All this may be patently obvious, but it deserves explication 
because intervention sacrifices the dearly held values of freedom 
and autonomy. ISS That does not fully answer our inquiry, however, 
for one can believe fundamentally that protective services are jus-
tified but disagree that lawyers ought to be permitted to make 
competence determinations, even tentative ones.lS9 The rationale 
163. See Luban, supra note 29, at 493. Luban's thesis holds that paternalism may be 
justified only if its object is acting contrary to values that he continues to hold. This formula 
avoids intervention on the grounds that the individual is not furthering his interests. This 
type of intervention has also been referred to as "soft paternalism." J. CHILDRESS, supra 
note 4, at 18. 
164. Because paternalism always violates the rights of its object, see Gert & Culver, 
Paternalistic Behavior, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 45, 52-53 (1976), it can be justified only if based 
on moral imperatives that override the object's rights to autonomy and liberty. The propo-
nent of paternalism always bears the burden of proving justification, but paternalism is gen-
erally viewed as morally acceptable to prevent harm. Dworkin, supra note 71, at 125-26; see 
also Wikler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 377, 378 (1979). 
165. Even the most aggressive critics of the abuse of guardianship and commitment 
proceedings appear to concede that benevolent intervention is appropriate in certain cases. 
See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 74, at 1435; Morse, supra note 75, at 653-54. 
166. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 84, at 99-101; Marzen, O'Dowd, . 
Crane & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 97 (1985). 
167. The staunchest opponents of paternalism concede that it is appropriate when the 
person has not carefully chosen the harm to befall him, particularly if the choice is irreversi-
ble. See Dworkin, supra note 71, at 118-19, 122-23 (J.S. Mill's absolutist position against 
interference to protect the decisionmaker himself does not apply to those who "lack some of 
the emotional and cognitive capacities required in order to make fully rational decisions"). 
168. Of course, intervention might be better viewed as protecting freedom and auton-
omy because it seeks to preserve options that are not being sacrificed consciously but that 
will be lost without intervention. This reasoning was applied by John Stuart Mill even to 
those who choose to give up future freedom and autonomy. For instance, Mill did not ex-
tend his radical anti paternalism to contracts for perpetual involuntary servitude. "The prin-
ciple of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be 
allowed to alienate his freedom." J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 104 (1947 ed.), quoted in Dworkin, 
supra note 71, at 118. 
169. The author knows of no published source that expressly makes this argument, 
but it is a critical one. At least two separate issues are important here. First, may the lawyer 
begin to look for other decisionmaking methods if she seriously questions competence and 
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for such a position rests not only on the lawyer's role of confidante 
and ally, but also on the very real danger of overreaching by law-
yers. To permit lawyer intervention in specific cases, it may be ar-
gued, will create serious long-term harm for clients generally, be-
cause lawyers who are permitted limited paternalism are apt to 
misread the limits, even when acting in the utmost good faith. 
Given this risk, it is better to accept occasional harm to individuals 
(such as the loss of Mr. H's home) as the cost of protecting the 
autonomy interests of clients generally.170 
This Article rejects that argument, although as noted above, 
the calculus for evaluating the choices is not very precise. The 
above argument favors as a superior moral choice benefits to 
clientdom generally over the protection of Mr. H. The benefits of 
decreased paternalism (which is actually no more than a mere pre-
diction of decreased paternalism),l7l however, are speculative and 
hypothetical. The danger to Mr. H is real and unavoidable.172 The 
value of prohibiting lawyer intervention in cases of imminent harm 
to individual clients because of predictions about possible future 
overreaching is illusive. Choosing Mr. H's concrete concerns over 
the ephemeral concerns of clientdom generally is an equal, if not 
superior, moral choice. Indeed, perhaps the predicted overreaching 
can be dealt with by more. effective limits on the nature of 
intervention. 
This Article will proceed, therefore, on the assumption that 
capacity? This question is relatively easily answered in the affirmative because that resolu-
tion espouses limited paternalism. Second, may the lawyer herself actively restrain her cli-
ent's choices? This Article discourages that kind of license because the risk of unrestrained 
lawyer paternalism is so great. 
170. This approach might be seen as a form of rule utilitarianism: "What would hap-
pen if everyone were to do that in such cases?" Frankena, Ethics, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 119 (G. Hazard & D. Rhode eds. 1985). It differs from the 
usual teleological justification because it does not argue that adhering to such a ban would 
most often lead to correct utilitarian results. Rather, it argues that the absence of a ban will 
invite discretion that is empirically likely to be abused by lawyers who do not observe the 
limits imposed by ethical standards. 
171. The benefits of decreased paternalism are not very much in dispute. See authori-
ties cited supra note 29. The prediction that lawyers will overreac~ if limited intervention is 
permitted, on the other hand, rests on much more speculative ground. 
172. It is a common criticism of rule utilitarianism that adherence to a rule in the face 
of actual imminent harm is very difficult to justify. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. 9HILDRESS, 
supra note 84, at 26-28. A rule favoring protection of clients in general over protection of 
individual clients rests on even weaker ground because there is no empirical data supporting 
its hypothesis that lawyers will overreach sufficiently often and seriously enough to justify 
permitting client injury. Ct. A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
110-11, 133-37 (1980) (assertion that confidentiality rules increase client disclosure and trust 
is not verifiable and probably not accurate). 
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intervention-some limited intervention, at least-into the lives of 
self-destructive incompetents is an ethically principled course of 
action.173 In our example of Mr. H, some intervention is appropri-
ate. His decisionmaking process is apparently impaired, for his re-
luctance to sue is articulated as the result of satanic and other ap-
parently psychotic delusions and not an appreciation of the facts 
of the situation. Under these facts he would quite likely be found 
incompetent (at least with regard to this series of decisions) by an 
enlightened court.174 He will suffer serious harm without interven-
tion, for he will be rendered homeless; his health may well suffer; 
and his sole asset will be lost.175 
It is not necessarily immoral to act on paternalistic impulses 
in justified cases,176 even though permission to intervene at the 
lawyer's discretion might lead ineluctably to increased, unjustified 
paternalism among lawyers generally. This fear, however, was only 
one of two reasons offered in opposition to lawyer .intervention. 
The second reason was that alluded to originally,177 that the law-
yer's role prohibits intervention, because intervention equates with 
loss of rights and the lawyer's duty of loyalty precludes advocating 
for or instigating the loss of a client's rights. 
This Article also rejects that argument. The simplistic ration-
ale for rejecting it is that the immediacy of client injury overrides 
the ethical imperatives accompanying the lawyer's role. But in fact 
the rationale is more complex than that, and'the following discus-
sion of the various modes of intervention will address the role ten-
173. For an entertaining dialogue on the ethics of strict reliance on consent as a basis 
for conduct, see West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral 
and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985); 
Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 1431 (1986); West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1986). 
174. The qualification that the court be "enlightened" is necessary given the evidence 
that often courts hearing guardianship cases are not. See Mitchell, supra note 74, at 1415-
19. 
175. The example of Mr. H encompasses threats to both his health and his economic 
interests. It therefore avoids the difficult issue of which type of interest standing alone war-
rants paternalism. Obviously no bright lines can be drawn, but one can assume that health 
might generally be accorded greater weight than money for two reasons. First, it may be 
argued that health is more important than money for preserving future autonomy. See 
Dworkin, supra note 71, at 118-21. Second, loss of health is apt to be irreversible, hence 
more readily justifying intervention. 
176. Although the questions of who determines what paternalism is justified and how 
that determination is made will never be resolved adequately, the remainder of the Article 
tries to address those issues. 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01. 
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sions more fully. At this point, however, there is one important 
consideration: if the lawyer correctly determines (1) that the cli-
ent's competence has failed, (2) that the client has chosen a course 
of conduct contrary to his values, and (3) that in fact he would 
choose differently if he were competent, then the lawyer's decision 
to try to achieve what the client actually values is not disloyal be-
havior.178 It may be disloyal vis-a-vis the client's present wants,179 
but not vis-a-vis the client's enduring values. So when the lawyer 
correctly perceives incompetence, some intervention is appropri-
ate. Misperception is the real problem, the "slippery slope" issue 
addressed above. 
Another reason for attorney-client interaction that transcends 
ordinary informed consent is raised by the example involving Mr. 
M, who refuses to make a choice. While it is true that refusal to 
choose is itself a choice,18o it is very difficult to argue convincingly 
that by refusing to choose Mr. M is actually choosing not to liti-
gate. Although that conclusion may be correct in some cases,181 it 
would be entirely incorrect in other circumstances.182 If nonchoice 
is probably the result of impaired reasoning ability (an extreme 
example is a comatose individual),183 reliance on fictional informed 
consent is dishonest and unjustifiable. With Mr. M, then, the law-
yer should explore whether nonchoice is actually a choice or merely 
the absence of choice. 
Thus, intervention or deviance from informed consent184 is not 
barred ex ante. Even a concession that lawyers need not always 
treat their clients as competent does not resolve all of the tension, 
for the lawyer's role makes conventional approaches troublesome. 
178. See Luban, supra note 29, at 491. 
179. Id. 
180. J. KATZ, supra note 56, at 154-63. 
181. The mere fact that Mr. M's nonchoice appears objectively unwise does not neces-
sarily mean that it is an incompetent decision. See Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 
376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); Annas & Densberger, supra note 86, at 570-71. 
182. This is self-evident, as long as one acknowledges the reality of incompetence. Mr. 
M's inability to make a reasoned choice or to articulate a basis for his choosing the default 
(nonchoice) option is certainly evidence of a lack of competence. See Appelbaum & Roth, 
supra note 72, at 1467. 
183. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 972 
(1976). In re Spring, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 831, 399 N.E.2d 493 (1979), rev'd, 380 Mass. 629, 405 
N.E.2d 115 (1980). 
184. Characterizing substituted judgment decisionmaking as deviation from informed 
consent is probably incorrect. Its purpose is to be as faithful as our methods will allow to 
the choices that the client would make were he competent. See Annas, Reconciling Quinlan 
and Saikewicz: Decision Making for the Terminally III Incompetent, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 367, 
373-75 (1979). 
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The types of intervention that are justifiable must be identified. 
The next sections address that issue. 
B. The Guardianship Conundrum 
The example involving Mr. H illustrates the dilemma posed by 
guardianship. It might be said that what Mr. H needs in the guise 
of protective services is someone to make decisions for him, a 
proxy who will arrange Mr. H's affairs as he would were he compe-
tent to do SO.ISI\ For reasons of accountability, uniformity, and"pro-
tection of contracting third parties, the law has developed the 
guardianship proceeding as the exclusive method of establishing 
proxy decisionmakers.ls6 By limiting substitute decisionmaking to 
one court-appointed proxy, the law avoids multiple intervention by 
different actors with differing agendas, minimizes abuse and con-
flicts of interest, and puts third parties on notice that nonap-
pointed agents generally have no authority to bind the ward.ls7 If 
Mr. H had relatives or friends with the means to bring a petition, 
the court would likely appoint a guardian, who would probably au-
thorize the lawsuit to save Mr. H's house. 
Model Rule 1.14 suggests that Mr. H's lawyer could seek a 
guardian for him.lss Such a suggestion, however, raises several con-
cerns and implicates unavoidable and significant breaches of other 
professional ethical standards. Consider Mr. H's situation. Mr. H's 
attorney, seeking to avoid the harsh consequences of doing nothing 
but fearful of acting without consent, might investigate the possi-
bility of a guardianship. If she decides to pursue that option, she 
must file a petition alleging incompetence and seeking appoint-
ment of a guardian by the probate court. The substance of this act 
and its procedural ramifications demonstrate the untenable situa-
tion that such a decision creates for a lawyer. Appointment of a 
guardian is generally recognized as a drastic and virtually complete 
deprivation of civil rights.lsll If a guardian were appointed for Mr. 
H, he would lose his right to make legally binding decisions, to 
vote, to own property, to choose his place and manner of living, to 
make medical decisions, and so on. Short of imprisonment or com-
mitment, appointment of a guardian is the most serious restriction 
185. See Note, supra note 100, at 1014; Regan, supra note 123, at 607-09. 
186. For a history of the guardianship process, see Frolik, supra note 98, at 600-25. 
187. See generally 39 AM. JUR. 20 Guardian & Ward (1968). 
188. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14(b). 
189. See Mitchell, supra note 74, at 1433-47; Comment, supra note 74. 
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of a person's liberty. The paternalistic and benign purposes of 
guardianship do not blunt its harsh consequences. A lawyer's deci-
sion to impose guardianship on a client without his consent or un-
derstanding is particularly difficult to justify given the lawyer's ob-
ligations of loyalty and zeal. 
The procedural posture accentuates the awkwardness of the 
lawyer's position. Because of the deprivation of rights and liberties, 
a prospective ward is often entitled to counsel for purposes of op-
posing the petition. l9O Thus; a lawyer who is the petitioner is "su-
ing" her own client, who must have other counsel to oppose the 
petition. All this is just an interlude of sorts, after which the law-
yer probably intends to continue representing' her client in the 
matter that caused her to seek a guardian in the first place. Mean-
while, for evidence to support her petition, the lawyer will presum-
ably rely on communications she received from her client in the 
course of her earlier representation. Such communications, how-
ever, are entirely confidential,l9l and may have been made after 
assurances that they would be maintained in confidence.192 Thus, 
viewed from its harshest perspective, the process looks like this: 
the client hires the lawyer to serve as his loyal agent and confi-
dante; the lawyer promises him that those expectations are war-
ranted and will be fulfilled; the lawyer then uses her client's confi-
190. Because guardianship proceedings may impose substantial restrictions on a 
ward's liberty, several jurisdictions provide for the ward's right to be represented by coun-
sel. See Devine, supra note 133, at 499-500; Frolik, supra note 98, at 629-37. See, e.g., ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 1l0V2 11 1la-llb (Smith-Hurd 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-303(B) (1978); 
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-303(b) (1983); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY 
DISABLED, MODEL STATUTE 136 (1979). 
191. MODEL CODE, supra note 9, Canon 4, DR 4-101(A), (B) (lawyer shall not know-
ingly reveal information protected by attorney-client privilege or other information gained 
in professional relationship that client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of 
which would be embarrassing or detrimental to client); MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.6 
(lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of client without client con-
sent or unless impliedly authorized). Under either standard client communications indicat-
ing incompetence are privileged and confidential. Under the Model Code, the revelation of 
the client's mental disability is prohibited because it is both embarrassing and detrimental 
to the client. Under the Model Rules, the matter is confidential because there is neither 
express nor implied consent. See Devine, supra note 133, at 500-02. 
192. Lawyers often assure clients early in the representation that everything said will 
be held in confidence, even if some matters might later be revealed under certain excep-
tional circumstances. See generally Crystal, Confidentiality Under the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 215 (1982); Freedman, Professional Responsibility of 
the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); 
Popkin, Client-Lawyer Confidentiality, 59 TEx. L. REV. 755 (1981); Wolfram, Client Per-
jury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977). But see A. GOLDMAN, supra note 172, at 135 (breaking 
such promises when justified presents no moral issue). 
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dences to bring a court proceeding that will deprive him of all his 
rights, and will require him to obtain another lawyer to defend 
against it; and all the while the lawyer plans to resume represent-
ing him once this distraction is over. This representation is obvi-
ously chock full of direct ethical violations.193 
The serious professional responsibility concerns that inevita-
bly arise in this scenario, however, do not necessarily mandate 
banning this approach. The consequences of not intervening, and 
the harm to the client, may well warrant overriding the usual ethi-
cal considerations.194 Before considering the question of balancing 
ethical rules against the client's interest in protection from harm, 
we should consider an alternative. Rather than instituting a guard-
ianship proceeding herself, Mr. H's lawyer could suggest that some 
third party file the petition. Although such a referral resolves some 
of the ethical problems, it creates some new difficulties of its own. 
The advantages of the referral approach are obvious. It avoids 
the most serious conflicts of interest that arise when the lawyer is 
the petitioner. The lawyer does not have to oppose her own client 
in court, nor use his confidences directly against him. The side-
switching problems are minimized, or at least hidden from view.191> 
The lawyer may remain her client's confidante and advocate, loyal 
and zealous to the extent that her personal beliefs do not color her 
representation.19s 
It does not follow, however, that this approach avoids loyalty 
and zeal problems. The problems do not necessarily require rejec-
tion of the referral approach but are indeed issues to be con-
193. See Devine, supra note 133, at 499-500. 
194. This assumes that one considers intervention unethical even though the Model 
Rule 1.14 permits such behavior. Balancing conflicting ethical principles, of course, is not 
new in the field of professional responsibility. The classic example is balancing the lawyer's 
duty of zealous advocacy with her obligation to the judicial system. See, e.g., Curtis, The 
Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1951); Hazard, How Far Maya Lawyer Go in Assist-
ing a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669 (1981); Schwartz, supra 
note 10; Simon, supra note 29; see also A. GOLDMAN, supra note 172, at 111-12 (what is 
morally correct depends on balancing competing moral concerns). 
195. How well hidden the lawyer's side-switching is depends a lot on how secretive the 
lawyer remains vis-a.-vis her client regarding the referral. 
196. The lawyer's personal disagreement with the client's position is not ipso facto an 
obstacle to continuing the representation. The Model Code advises lawyers to maintain the 
representation notwithstanding the repugnance of the subject matter or the lawyer's belief 
regarding the merits of the action. MODEL CODE, supra note 9, EC 2-29. Of course, if the 
lawyer's personal beliefs interfere with her ability to provide adequate counsel, she should 
not continue to represent the client. ld. DR 2-110(c), (d) (permissive withdrawal when cli-
ent's conduct "renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out [her] employ-
ment"); cf. Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959). 
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fronted. For example, one might argue that the referral is not dis-
loyal because there is no "harm" in merely referring the issue of 
guardianship to a fair tribunal, provided the client has able repre-
sentation.197 This argument fails for two reasons, one conceptual 
and one empirical. The conceptual objection disagrees with the as-
sumption that a client is not entitled to avoid referral to a tribu-
nal. It is incorrect to assume that the duties of loyalty, zeal, and 
confidentiality only restrain the lawyer from harming her client di-
rectly. Even if the lawyer's actions are not a priori harmful, they 
may be unacceptable. The lawyer's ethical duties promote client 
choice and the question of "harm" is one of individual client per-
ception, not one of objective measure. A lawyer, for example, may 
not send her client on an involuntary but expense-paid vacation to 
Barbados, not because it would be harmful, but simply because he 
might wish to spend his time in other ways. 
In addition, the guardianship process is harmful in a more ob-
jective sense, even if the determination is fair, neutral, and cor-
rect.198 An accusation of incompetence and mental illness can 
hardly be beneficial or even neutral. It is little solace that one has 
the opportunity to defend against the accusation because the accu-
sation itself causes irreparable harm. 
The empirical objection to the argument that a lawyer who 
uses the referral approach is not really responsible for causing the 
guardianship is simply that guardianship petitions tend to be 
granted.199 From the judge's perspective this result is almost un-
derstandable because the safer and wiser course, except in clearly 
inappropriate proceedings, is to appoint a guardian.20o Because the 
ward may continue to live in his home, see his friends and rela-
tives, and otherwise lead an ostensibly "normal" life, guardianship 
appears to be a minor inconvenience. Denial of the petition, on the 
197. The lawyer's argument that the referral is not itself harmful is as follows: It is 
wrong for me to deprive my client of rights or benefits. What I am doing, however, is noth-
ing of the sort. I am calling attention to the possibility that my client may require, and may 
benefit from, intervention. I will assure by all means available that no inappropriate inter-
vention occurs. I will see to it that someone argues vigorously against intervention. If no 
intervention occurs, my client has not been harmed. If, despite all advocacy, intervention is 
permitted, my client is not harmed, for he has no right to avoid justified, benign, and legally 
appropriate assistance. This argument, however, does not solve the lawyer's loyalty 
dilemma. 
198. The evidence suggests that D;lost guardianship proceedings are not very fair or 
neutral. See Frolik, supra note 98; Mitchell, supra note 74, at 1415-19; Comment, supra 
note 74. 
199. Mitchell, supra note 74, at 1425. 
200. [d. at 1419. 
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other hand, creates the specter of unpaid bills, lack of food and 
heat, and eviction or foreclosure. Thus, referral actually creates the 
guardianship. To pretend that it merely deflects the decision to 
others is less than honest. 
Moreover, the referral approach creates two additional 
problems. First, the referring lawyer will probably represent her 
client in the guardianship proceeding, vigorously opposing the pe-
tition.201 Although it is a central tenet of professional ethics that a 
lawyer may argue for a position with which she personally dis-
agrees, and in fact such "fungibility" of roles is in many ways fun-
damental to professional role ethics,202 the incongruity and dishon-
esty of the lawyer's position in such a proceeding is more than a 
little disconcerting.203 Dishonesty is also at the heart of the second 
problem raised by a referral. If a guardian seems necessary, but the 
client strongly opposes such an imposition, the referral works best 
when the client does not know about it. The referral must be secret 
if the lawyer hopes to continue representing her client.204 If the 
referral approach is justified, professionally sanctioned dishonesty 
must be accepted205 or, alternatively, client rapport and trust must 
201. See In re Quesnell, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973) (en banc); Mass. Ethics 
Op. 80-4, supra note 145; Devine, supra note 133, at 495. 
202. See Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.BA J. 
1159, 1159 (1958) (ABA!AALS Joint Conference Report). The "fungibility" notion arises 
directly from the profession's demand that lawyers be zealous, see supra note 10, and from 
the profession's concomitant absolution of zealous lawyers from legal or moral responsibility 
for the positions taken or the character of their clients. The term "fungibility" is intended 
to communicate that in any given case a lawyer could have represented either party, and it 
is happenstance that determines which client the lawyer in fact finds herself representing. C. 
WOLFRAM, supra note 66, at 578-82. 
203. Even if one fully accepts lawyer neutrality and fungibility, the suggestion that a 
lawyer could defend a client in a proceeding essentially instigated by the lawyer strains 
credibility. It is one thing to assert that lawyers may defend the guilty or represent clients 
with whose claims they disagree; it is another thing entirely to contend the lawyer may 
pursue one result secretly (by referral) and yet publicly defend the client against that result. 
The inherent hypocrisy of the advocate's role would reach new heights if this were allowed. 
See Luban, supra note 73; see also Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 
55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 73-83 (1980) (discussing advocate's role and responsibility); Simon, 
supra note 29, at 76-77 (noting cognitive dissonance of advocate's role). 
204. It seems likely that the attorney who has represented the client in the past would 
continue to do so after a guardian is appointed. If the client is poor, the chances of this 
occurring are obviously enhanced, for alternative counsel are simply not available. But see 
Devine, supra note 133, at 508 (once lawyer has decided to seek protective services, "the 
relationship with the client must terminate," because lawyer's personal or professional inter-
ests adversely affect representation). 
205. One might argue that if guardianship referral is made by the lawyer, effective 
representation can be preserved only if the client is unaware of the lawyer's involvement. 
Some dishonesty to the client would therefore be necessary and, perhaps, justified. See S. 
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be sacrificed' to the principle of honesty within the relationship.206 
These are not easy choices. 
Two other concerns arise from a lawyer's decision to pursue 
guardianship, whether directly or by referral. First, the attorney-
client relationship is almost certain to deteriorate.207 Trust and 
confidentiality have always been professional ideals,208 and anyac-
tion that fosters mistrust and antagonism, as pursuing guardian-
ship likely will, should be discouraged. This consideration is not 
peculiar to lawyers, of course. Family members or friends who feel 
BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 131-35 (1983). Such an argument 
tracks the "therapeutic privilege" sometimes asserted in medicine. The substance of that 
privilege is that doctors may lie about or withhold information regarding the patient's medi-
cal condition if, in the doctor's judgment, disclosure would be harmful to the patient. See 
Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis from Patient Sick With Seri-
ous or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REV. 349 (1946); Capron, supra note 35, at 387-92, 405. The 
therapeutic privilege has been the subject of considerable criticism. See, e.g., Comment, In-
formed Consent: The Illusion of Patient Choice, 23 EMORY L.J. 503, 514-16 (1974); Gold-
stein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflection on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed 
Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 692 (1975). 
It is not at all clear that such dishonesty would be justified in the case of a guardianship 
referral. It should be noted, however, that the Comment to Model Rule 1.4 contains a provi-
sion implying a similar "therapeutic privilege" for lawyers. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9, 
Rule 1.4 Comment 11 4 (lawyer may delay transmission of information when client would be 
likeiy to react imprudently). This provision is consistent in spirit with the liberal authority 
granted attorneys by Model Rule 1.14. See supra notes 119-36 and accompanying text. 
206. Rejecting dishonesty is likely to result in client dissatisfaction when the lawyer 
refers her client for protective services proceedings. To determine whether such dissatisfac-
tion is too great a price to pay for honesty, consider the utilitarian bases for the profession's 
usual emphasis on fostering client trust. The primary purpose is complete disclosure to the 
lawyer who must know everything the client knows to provide effective representation. See 
M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 4-5 (quoting A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE 
FUNCTION 147 (1971»; Landsman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 
1980 UTAH L. REV. 765, 783-86. But see A. GOLDMAN, supra note 172, at 133-37 (full disclo-
sure need not receive so much attention); S. BOK, supra note 205, at 122 (such a purpose for 
trustworthiness is "potentially treacherous"). 
Any impairment of the lawyer's effectiveness as a result of this breach in the relation-
ship must be dealt with. If other counsel are available, the lawyer might choose to withdraw, 
see MODEL CODE, supra note 9, DR 2-110(c)(1), (2), unless the client retains the lawyer 
notwithstanding the distrust that may have arisen, see id. DR 5-105(c) (lawyer may re-
present client notwithstanding impaired professional judgment if client consents and it is 
obvious that lawyer can represent client adequately); MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 
1.7(b)(1), (2) (similar rules). 
207. This assumes that the profession rejects concealing the lawyer's role in the pro-
ceedings from clients. Any other choice seems quite unworkable. 
208. All guardianships, except those for profoundly impaired persons who do not un-
derstand the proceedings or for consenting wards (assuming that the concept is not an oxy-
moron, see infra note 213) are likely to interfere to some degree with the relationship be-
tween the ward and the guardian or the petitioner. The fact that this applies to the 
attorney-client relationships as well should not serve as the basis for prohibiting lawyers 
from pursuing guardianship in appropriate cases. 
No.3] LAWYER DECISIONMAKING 565 
compelled to institute guardianship proceedings generally recog-
nize the substantial challenge to the relationship that such a choice 
entails. 
The second concern is that guardianship is both a serious pub-
lic stigma and a status that is often abused.209 In comparison to the 
other options theoretically available to the attorney it is by far the 
most intrusive. Furthermore, guardianship is relatively permanent 
and intractable. If the lawyer needs the authority to handle one 
rather isolated, concrete matter, resort to guardianship might be 
overkill.210 Finally, a guardianship proceeding could lead to referral 
for commitment,211 a far more drastic result than the lawyer 
intended. 
Any pursuit by the lawyer of guardianship, whether direct or 
indirect, creates serious loyalty, zeal, and confidentiality problems. 
Should the profession prohibit such action given these problems? 
At least one state ethics committee has hinted that such a prohibi-
tion is warranted. In a 1980 Ethics Opinion,212 the Committee on 
Professional Ethics of the Massachusetts Bar Association con-
cluded that the lawyer's duties of loyalty and confidentiality forbid 
pursuing guardianship, or even recommending it to a third 
party.213 This opinion arose in the civil commitment context and 
209. See In re Guardianship of Reyes, 731 P.2d 130, 131 (Ariz. App. 1986) (stigma and 
deprivation of liberty); see also authorities cited supra note 189. 
210. See Frolik, supra note 98, at 649-59. For a client who otherwise is in control of 
his life and functioning adequately either in the community or in an institutional setting, 
petitioning for a guardian to enable the lawyer to carry out the representation seems harm-
ful and unnecessary. For the potential use of a guardian ad litem, see infra note 219. 
211. The possibility of referral for commitment is raised in the commentary to the 
Model Rules. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14 comment 11 5. 
212. See Mass. Ethics Op. 80-4, supra note 145. 
213. The factual background of Opinion 80-4 is as follows: A court-appointed attorney 
for a patient in an involuntary commitment proceeding was told by the client that she no 
longer wanted the lawyer to represent her, stating: "Who says you're my lawyer anyway? I 
want to get my own lawyer. You're trying to commit me." The lawyer believed that appoint-
ment of a guardian would permit him to continue to represent the person notwithstanding 
her objection. Id. 
The Massachusetts Bar Association Committee on Professional Responsibility con-
cluded (1) that the attorney cannot withdraw under such circumstances because of the 
court's appointment, and (2) that it would be inappropriate for the lawyer to suggest to the 
court or a third person that a guardian be appointed, because "[s]uch a suggestion would 
reflect the attorney's conclusions as to the client's competence, conclusions which almost 
invariably would be based on confidential statements made by the client to the lawyer." Id. 
The Committee, however, did not rule out the possibility of a lawyer making such a referral: 
Clearly, an attorney cannot suggest the appointment of a guardian where the client 
appears to be competent and has expressed opposition to appointment of a guardian. 
There may be cases in which a client cannot lucidly express his desires to his attorney 
and in which it is so clear that appointment of a guardian is the only means by which 
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consequently might be limited to its facts.214 It is nevertheless con-
trary both to Model Rule 1.14(b) that authorizes such a pursuit 
and to several other bar association ethics opinions that permit it 
as welplll 
A more appropriate resolution of this issue would borrow the 
Massachusetts Ethics Committee's concerns about lawyers pursu-
ing guardianship and would limit substantially the discretion the 
ABA gives to lawyers. The resulting rule would bar lawyers from 
pursuing guardianship unless serious harm is imminent, interven-
important legal rights of the client can be preserved that an attorney would be justi-
fied in making such a suggestion. An attorney should not reach such a conclusion as a 
routine matter or without a thorough investigation of his client's situation. Here the 
client has repeatedly expressed a desire to avoid commitment, suggesting that she is 
aware of her situation and at least at times is able coherently to express her wishes. 
Hence, the attorney must suggest the appointment of a guardian to the client, explain 
the advisability of such an appointment to her, and attempt to elicit her feelings on 
the matter before he can even consider suggesting to a third person that a guardian 
be appointed. 
[d. The intended meaning of requiring discussion with the client is not at all apparent, and 
all possible interpretations are unsatisfying. If the Committee intended that the lawyer not 
pursue guardianship without client consent, as the most likely reading implies, a no-win 
situation results. Client consent can be relied on only if it is competent consent, but if the 
client is competent the need for a referral for guardianship disappears. If, on the other 
hand, the client is not competent to consent or refuses to consent because of his confusion, 
the need for a guardian is greater but referral is foreclosed. In fact, because of the very 
definition of the condition permitting appointment of a guardian (lack of competence to 
make decisions), consensual guardianship is something of an oxymoron. 
214. In the context of Opinion 80-4, given the lawyer's court appointment to protect 
against societal infringement of the client's rights, the Committee's advice is certainly un-
derstandable. Considering that the client might be disabled but not committable, it would 
serve no purpose at all for the lawyer to drop the defense based on what might well be 
incompetent instruction from the client if the result would be an unfair and inappropriate 
commitment. See Baron, supra note 150. 
215. The ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT reports several state 
bar association ethics committee opinions apparently concluding that a lawyer's institution 
of guardianship proceedings against her client is not necessarily inappropriate. 2 LAWYERS 
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:4303 (ABA/BNA 1981) (Md. Op. 80-46: lawyer may 
seek to secure waiver of attorney-client privilege through appointment of a guardian if law-
yer is convinced that doing so is in client's best interests); id. at 801:4858 (Mich. Op. CI-882: 
lawyer may file petition for determination of client competence only if lawyer reasonably 
believes client is unable to act in own best interests, but revealing evidence of client's in-
competence is still barred by confidentiality duty); id. at 801:4889 (Mich. Op. CI-1055: law-
yer has choice of making decisions on behalf of client or seeking appointment of legal repre-
sentative); id. at 801:8824 (Va. Op. 570: lawyer has discretion to petition for guardianship 
and to withhold information from client, but must disclose to client that she possesses infor-
mation that she cannot reveal); id. at 801:8010 (Va. Op. 463: lawyer is urged to seek appoint-
ment of guardian); id. at 801:6322-23 (N.Y.C. Op. 81-32: lawyer herself should not seek ap-
pointment of a guardian but should cooperate with others, preferably family, to accomplish 
guardianship; lawyer must seek to preserve confidences); id. at 801:6343 (N.Y.C. Op. 83-1: 
lawyer may seek the appointment of a representative). 
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tion is necessary, no other ameliorative development is foresee-
able,216 and nonlawyers would be justified in seeking guardianship. 
This proposed standard is more exacting than'Model Rule 1.14, 
which allows lawyers to pursue guardianship so long as "the lawyer 
reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the cli-
ent's own interests."217 
A more exacting standard would have two almost contrary 
consequences. First, from a practical perspective, this standard 
might better reflect actual practice because the time, expense, and 
complexity of the process mean that resort to guardianship pro-
ceedings tends to be rare.218 From a conceptual or intellectual per-
spective, however, the more exacting standard causes problems 
rather than solving them. For a lawyer who adheres to the formali-
ties of proxy consent,. guardianship is the only lawful method of 
overriding a client's choice. It is the only safe and proven way to 
establish lawful substitute authority. If the avenue is closed, the 
lawyer who represents an impaired client must explore the other 
possible options.219 
216. Lawyer pursuit of guardianship should be discouraged if family members or other 
support networks can intervene to resolve competence or authority questions. If such alter-
native relief is foreseeable, the lawyer should refrain from pursuing a guardianship proceeq-
ing herself. Of course, the ethical difficulties addressed in this section do not arise at all if 
third parties independently see the need for protective services and act on their own. 
217. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14(b). 
218. The author knows of no studies supporting this conclusion. By analogy, however, 
the cost and complexity of guardianship make resort to that procedure very rare in the 
medical field. See, e.g., 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 185-86; Solnick, 
supra note 3, at 25-26; Note, supra note 100, at 1014. 
219. The discussion in the text applies not only to formal guardianship but also to the 
use of a guardian ad litem. "A 'guardian ad litem' is one appointed by a court, in which 
particular litigation is pending, to represent a ward or an unborn person in that particular 
litigation." MODEL PROBATE CODE § 196(b) (1946). The term guardian ad litem ("GAL") has 
two meanings. Some courts refer to an attorney appointed to represent a particular point of 
view in litigation as a GAL. See, e.g., In re Quesnell, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1974); 
Baron, supra note 145, at 122-24. This GAL role is really no different from that of ap-
pointed counsel used to balance out the adversary system. In other instances, however, a 
GAL is appointed to serve as a surrogate client, to make decisions for an incompetent client. 
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 201, § 34 (1985) (providing for appointment of GAL or "next 
friend" for mentally retarded or disabled person). This procedure is much more like formal 
guardianship in terms of the proxy decisionmaking role that it fills. 
Seeking appointment of a GAL raises the same ethical concerns as does seeking ap-
pointment of a formal guardian. In litigation, the court will not be aware o( the mental 
disability of the litigant unless attention is drawn to that fact. If disclosure of that disability 
is made by the opposing party, and a GAL is appointed before the disabled litigant has 
obtained counsel, no ethical concern arises, for the client's incompetence has been estab-
lished before the attorney-client relationship begins. See supra note 19. If, on the other 
hand, the disabled client's lawyer wishes the court to appoint a GAL to assist in decision-
making, the confidentiality and loyalty issues discussed in the context of formal guardian-
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C. Reliance on "Natural Guardians" for Proxy Consent 
In medical literature frequent attention is given to the role of 
next-of-kin or close friends in making decisions for incapacitated 
patients.22o Often reliance on this group, referred to on occasion as 
"natural guardians,"221 is recommended as a practical solution to 
an intractable problem.222 Given the prominence of this practice in 
medicine, the legal profession ought to give careful consideration 
to its use when consent is needed and no authorized representative 
exists. Although this practice is troublesome and replete with un-
resolved questions, both legal and ethical, it does offer a method of 
proxy consent that can work effectively. 
This Article cannot begin to explore fully the role of close 
family members in making critical decisions for impaired individu-
alS.223 What it can address, however, are some of the benefits and 
ship arise. See supra text accompanying notes 188·93. Although the limited authority of a 
GAL makes the intrusiveness less severe than in the case of formal gUardianship, disclosing 
the client's mental illness to the court cannot be reconciled with the lawyer's professional 
loyalties unless there is substantial justification for such a breach of duty. 
This issue arises repeatedly in the criminal context. Pleading lack of competence to 
stand trial is often an attractive strategy for a criminal defense attorney, but if the client 
chooses not to raise it the lawyer's options are limited. If the client chooses not to raise the 
defense but the attorney believes in good faith that the refusal is not competent, the lawyer 
faces the same dilemma that this Article addresses. There is an argument, however, that a 
criminal defense attorney has greater discretion to reveal the client's incompetence because 
of the constitutional interests at stake and because of her predefined role in the proceedings. 
There is substantial case law supporting this argument. See, e.g., Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 
F.2d 898, 902 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 416 (1986); Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 
F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, Oct. 27, 1986; McDonald v. Hutto, 414 F. 
Supp. 532, 535-36 (E.D. Ark. 1976); People v. Hill, 67 Cal. 2d 105, 429 P.2d 586, 592, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. 234, 240 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967); People v. Bolden, 99 Cal. App. 3d 
375, 379, 160 Cal. Rptr. 268, 270 (1979); State v. Aumann, 265 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Iowa Ct. 
App.), aff'd, 268 N.W.2d 228 (1978). See generally Bennett, supra note 16. 
220. See, e.g., 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 126-28, 182-85; 
Gauvey, Leviton, Shuger & Sykes, supra note 129, at 434-449; ReIman, The Saikewicz Deci-
sion: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 233 (1978); Note, supra note 100, at 1011-12. 
221. See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 182. 
222. [d. at 182-85; see ReIman, supra note 220, at 234-37; Solnick, supra note 3, at 20-
24; see also S. JORDAN, supra note 3, at 109-21 (proxy decisions for incompetents should be 
made by the "primary moral community" of that person, which is most often the family). 
223. The role of family members in decisionmaking raises two separate issues. First, 
what role do family members actually play in client decisionmaking, and how should their 
influence be accounted for in the counseling process? Cf. R. BURT, supra note 4 (all choices 
are functions of interactions with other people); T. SHAFFER, supra note 31, at 172-73 (trans-
ference created by family influences-in both the biological and ancient, archetypal senses). 
Second, of greater concern to this Article, may family members serve as proxy deci-
sionmakers for incompetents, and if so, how? The medical profession has begun to debate 
this issue, focusing, however, on the process more than on the substantive value of family 
member proxies. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 145; Baron, Medical Paternalism and the Rule 
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pitfalls of professional reliance on natural guardians. The manifest 
benefits fall into three categories. First, reliance on family mem-
bers imposes side constraints on lawyer overreaching.224 It is pref-
erable to unilateral lawyer usurpation of authority because it re-
quires the lawyer to articulate the considerations involved in the 
decision, just as she would with a competent client.225 Second, it is 
likely to provide a more accurate gauge of substituted judgment.226 
If lawyer paternalism is justified only in "wants over values" cases 
because its purp<;lse is loyalty to client values,227 who better to as-
sess those values than one who has known and perhaps lived with 
the client for years? Third, use of family members as proxies ac-
complishes what the guardianship process accomplishes but with-
out the time, expense, permanence, stigma, or ethical conflicts.228 
These benefits explain why the family frequently serves as a 
proxy decisionmaker in the medical field. But the medical profes-
sion addresses the serious pitfalls of such reliance far less often 
and less adroitly. The most important pitfall is that in many juris-
dictions the family has absolutely no lawful authority to give con-
sent.229 Professional justification of reliance on such questionable 
authority is extremely curious. Moreover, those states whose stat-
utes or common law permit family consent offer no guidance on 
how to resolve conflicting family sentiment or how to prioritize 
among family members.230 If a single family member will consent 
of Law, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 337 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Baron, Rule of Law]; Buchanan, 
supra note 129; ReIman, supra note 220. Jordan favors the family for substantive' moral 
reasons. S. JORDAN, supra note 3, at 109-20. 
224. Cf. Spiegel, supra note I, at 113-20 (informed consent limits lawyer's tendency to 
serve her own, rather than client's interests); see also Gauvey, Leviton, Shuger & Sykes, 
supra note 129, at 433-34 (reasons that physicians should not act on their own). 
225. Spiegel, supra note I, at 104. 
226. See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 183. 
227. See Luban, supra note 29, at 474. 
228. The cumbersome nature of resorting to the courts is inevitably raised as a justifi-
cation for relying on family members in the medical context. See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE 
DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 185-87 (resort to the courts is counterproductive in ordinary 
cases); Solnick, supra note 3, at 24-26. But see Baron, Rule of Law, supra note 223. Doctors 
are not alone in finding reliance on judicial guardianship unwise; patient advocates see 
much abuse in the process and thus do not favor it. See, e.g., Frolik, supra note 98, at 654-
55; Mitchell, supra note 74; Comment, supra note 74. 
229. See 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 206-45; Gauvey, Leviton, 
Shuger & Sykes, supra note 129, at 449; Solnick, supra note 3, at 19-24; Note, supra note 
100, at 993-94 (21 states have neither statute nor common law permitting family consent). 
230. Solnick, supra note 3, at 21. Dr. Solnick points out as an appropriate example the 
Mississippi statute, MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (1984), which, despite being the most com-
prehensive statute of this type, authorizes such arrangements as any parent consenting for 
an adult child "of unsound mind," or a spouse consenting for a spouse of unsound mind. Id. 
570 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1987: 515 
to what the lawyer wants, and the lawyer is not required to con-
sider any other input, informed consent is lost. No effort will be 
made to work through the real risk of differing interests among 
family members and the incompetent client.231 
If lawyers are to use family members as proxy decisionmakers, 
two requirements must be met. First, it must be lawful in the juris-
diction. Second, lawyers must act in good faith when exercising 
their discretion in seeking consent from the family. Considering 
that the profession has already given lawyers the authority to 
make substituted decisions (apparently presuming good faith), the 
use of the family as a buffer to lawyer interests can only be an 
improvement. Reliance on natural guardians, however, cannot be 
an option unless the profession develops guidelines regarding who 
may serve and how conflicts of interest will be recognized and dealt 
with. 
D. De Facto Guardianship 
The Model Rules advise that lawyers may act as de facto 
guardians for incompetent clients.232 The Model Code also implies 
that de facto guardianship is an option.233 The American Bar Asso-
ciation apparently believes that such usurpation of client consent 
is justifiable and lawful. Some courts have also expressed a similar 
opinion.234 The simplicity, efficiency, and relative unintrusiveness 
of this approach make it attractive, but the practical and concep-
tual difficulties it creates make the approach unwise. 
The Model Rules do not define "de facto" guardianship, but 
logically it means that the attorney makes decisions for her client, 
much as a guardian would. Presumably the lawyer would be bound 
Because the statute apparently leaves the determination of competence to the discretion of 
the family member as advised by a physician, a relative could easily overrule a competent 
but unusual medical choice. It is likely that such an "outcome" test is used rather fre-
quently to measure competence under this kind of statute. 
231. Solnick, supra note 3, at 22-24; Gauvey, Leviton, Shuger & Sykes, supra note 129, 
at 434 (potential for conflict of interests between family members and patient). 
232. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.14. 
233. MODEL CODE, supra note 9, EC 7-12. 
234. See, e.g., People v. Hill, 67 Cal. 2d 105, 429 P.2d 586, 592, 60 Cal. Rptr. 234, cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967); People v. Bolden, 99 Cal. App. 3d 375, 160 Cal. Rptr. 268 
(1979); State v. Aumann, 265 N.W.2d 36, 318-19 (Iowa Ct. App.), alf'd, 268 N.W.2d 228 
(Iowa 1978). In re A.G., 448 So. 2d 183, 186 (La. App. 1984). Notably, each of these cases 
involved criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings where loss of liberty was an issue, which 
may account for the courts' willingness to delegate to counsel the role of opposing the state's 
position. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53. 
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by strict fiduciary responsibilities235 and standards for determining 
propriety of proxy decisions that apply to guardians.236 The advan-
tages of this approach are not only apparent, they are also similar 
to some of those offered by reliance on natural guardians. The 
most obvious benefit of permitting this conduct is that it provides 
an inexpensive, simple, and nonpublic remedy for the problem of 
client incompetence. In Mr. H's situation, for example, if his law-
yer simply decides to file suit on his behalf rather than to seek a 
guardian for him, she can avoid the following serious complica-
tions: the cost, time, and effort of a guardianship proceeding;237 the 
public charge of mental illness against her client; the substantial, 
almost inevitable, risk that, instead of the limited guardianship 
sought, the court will appoint a plenary guardian or refer Mr. H 
for commitment;238 and the professional responsibility quandaries 
that are unavoidable when a lawyer pursues guardianship for her 
client.239 
In addition, the lawyer has a persuasive argument that she in 
fact will watch over her client's rights and interests as well as any 
other third party appointed by the court. Because guardians are 
only ordinary people trying to make reasonable decisions for their 
wards, there is no inherent reason to believe that the attorney will 
not do as good a job as anyone else. There is nothing magical about 
235. Guardians are held to fiduciary accountability in managing their ward's estate. 
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 2, comment (b) (1959); Florida Bar v. Van 
Deventer, 368 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1979); Fuehring v. Union Trust of Indianapolis, 73 N.E.2d 754, 
757 (Ind. 1945); Hoveson v. Hoveson, 216 Minn. 237, 12 N.W.2d 497, 500 (1943). 
236. The term "propriety" refers to the process that the guardian uses to reach proxy 
decisions. Most courts require "substituted judgment" decisionmaking, i.e., the decisions the 
ward would have made were he competent. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School 
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 750, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430 (1977) (court's goal is to determine 
with as much accuracy as possible the wants and needs of the incompetent individual); 
Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980); Frolik, supra note 98, at 618-25; 
see also Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. 
REV. 386, 401-03 (1981) (substituted judgment standard is useless when patient has never 
expressed a preference). Other courts have held that guardians must adopt the more objec-
tive "best interests" approach to decisionmaking. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 426 
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 
7,226 N.W.2d 180, 181 (1975) (court refused to allow ward to serve as kidney donor because 
surgery was not in ward's best interests); see also Frolik, supra note 98, at 611-18. 
237. See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 175, 185-87; Note, supra 
note 100, at 1014. 
238. Frolik, supra note 98, at 654-55 (courts generally appoint full guardians even 
when limited guardians would be more appropriate). For an analysis of Utah's guardianship 
statute, see Comment, A Critique and Revision of the Utah Guardianship Statute for Inca-
pacitated Persons, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 629. 
239. See supra text accompanying notes 188-211. 
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court appointment that turns ordinary good faith decisions into 
"correct" decisions. Moreover, another justification for de facto 
guardianship is the recognition that it is a common practice. There 
is some wisdom in establishing ethical guidelines that do not con-
tradict the exigencies of practicallawyering.240 
All these justifications are valid, and their persuasiveness 
makes it difficult to argue for a contrary rule. This efficient and 
sometimes effective scheme does, however, have fundamental 
problems that warrant denying lawyers this kind of authority. An 
initial objection is that other professionals, most notably doctors, 
may not act as de facto guardians.241 This may not appear self-
evident initially, for doctors are known to treat incompetent pa-
tients without proxy consent.242 But in fact physicians may not jus-
tifiably treat patients without either formal court authorization or 
informal consent from next-of-kin,243 except in emergencies. This 
principle has been stressed in a continuing series of judicial opin-
ions prohibiting involuntary administration of antipsychotic medi-
cation to mentally ill patients who have been committed.244 Ac-
240. See Frankel, supra note 103, at 876-78. 
241. See Baron, Rule of Law, supra note 223. 
242. See Meisel, supra note 3, at 473-76; ReIman, supra note 220, at 237 (complaining 
that Saikewicz will cause doctors to continue their purportedly unauthorized decisionmak-
ing "in the closet"). 
243. A brief explanation of the state of the law in the confusing area of medical treat-
ment for incompetent patients is called for because the judicial decisions and literature on 
this intensely debated issue are apparently inconsistent. Courts generally recognize a pa-
tient's right to be free from all nonconsensual treatment. See Shultz, supra note 35 (discus-
sion of such cases). Incompetence does not deprive a patient of this right. Superintendent of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Baron, Rule 
of Law, supra note 223; Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to 
Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461 (1977). These two principles are universaL Adding 
the presumption of competence to this formula, see supra note 96, one might conclude that 
physicians have no right to treat incompetent patients without lawful, perhaps even court-
ordered, proxy consent. 
This conclusion, however, is not consistently adopted by the courts. In certain circum-
stances court approval is required, such as when a decision to terminate or refuse life-pro-
longing treatment is involved, Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 433; Brophy v. New England Sinai 
Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986), or when antipsychotic medication is adminis-
tered. In less critical cases reliance on the good faith of physicians is sometimes permitted, 
although it is always assumed that the physician obtained some consent. See, e.g., In re 
Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center, 73 Misc. 2d 395, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1973); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1964). Except for the medical profession's own prescriptive literature, see, e.g., Inglefinger, 
Arrogance, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1507 (1980); Marzuk, The Right Kind of Paternalism, 310 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1474 (1985); ReIman, supra note 220, no authority has sanctioned unilat-
eral decisionmaking by physicians without some lawful proxy consent. 
244. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1214 (1985); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269-70 (3d Cir. 1983); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 
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cording to these cases, treatment may not be given to 
nonconsenting, incompetent patients unless a guardian is ap-
pointed and court approval is obtained for the treatment plan.245 
In such cases psychiatrists, like lawyers, can claim that physician 
decisionmaking is more efficient, is as likely to be correct,246 is less 
stigmatizing to the patient, and comports with the reality of medi-
cal practice. The courts have expressly or implicitly rejected those 
claims.247 The autonomy interests of the patient and the physi-
cian's potential conflict of interest248 reqUIre resort to 
guardianship.249 
The Model Rules grant to lawyers authority that psychiatrists 
are denied-the right to make decisions for the client/patient when 
the professional sees fit to do so. Even if an objection based on this 
incongruity across professions seems somewhat superficial (consis-
tency across professions is not necessarily a hallowed virtue), it 
identifies yet another instance of apparent lawyer self-protection 
through self-regulation.250 Furthermore, the objection is valid on 
F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 985 (1971); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929-30 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. 
Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1365-66 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 50, 
653 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); 
Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 
Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983). 
245. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361-64 (D. Mass. 1979). 
246. Id. at 1363-64. 
247. Id. at 1362-63, 1367. 
248. Id. 
249. In at least one respect the question posed in Rogers-type cases is distinguishable 
from the question of lawyer-client authority allocation. In Rogers the federal district court 
was particularly concerned with the serious, debilitating, and generally irreversible side-ef-
fects of the antipsychotic medication known as tardive dyskinesia. Prolonged use of the 
medication causes severe facial muscle twitches and distortion. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1360. 
The nature of this risk caused the court to require substituted judgment for the incompe-
tent patient's desires. Only if the patient himself would be willing to assume the risk could 
it be imposed on him. Id. at 1361-64. The magnitude of the risk caused the court to order 
additionally that the decision could not be made solely by a guardian but had to be re-
viewed and approved by a court. Id. at 1362-64. 
Lawyers' decisions generally are less likely to have such life-altering side-effects, and 
thus one might say that the reasoning of Rogers is inapposite. But that argument is not 
faithful to the decision. Rogers emphasized the importance of autonomy and self-determina-
tion in general, not just in exceptionally serious cases. In fact the opinion appears to stand 
for the proposition that all substantial decisions must be made through a guardianship or 
other lawful process, and in exceptional cases the court will review the decision to assure 
that the guardian makes the best decision possible. See also In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 
642, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 
Mass. 728, 757, 370·N.E.2d 417 (1977). But see supra note 243. 
250. The legal profession's self-regulation has not been without its critics, who point 
out the self-protectionist effect of many of the bar's ethical standards. See, e.g., Abel, Why 
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far more substantial grounds. It is not merely for consistency that 
lawyers should be held to the same standards as physicians; it is 
because these restrictions reflect important values and principles 
and lawyers should be bound by them as well. 
Before exploring the other objections to this option, let us first 
distinguish between broad and narrow views of de facto authority, 
for it is really the broad version that is most objectionable. The 
broad view would allocate to lawyers full authority to make major 
legal decisions, e.g., to institute litigation, to settle litigation, or to 
disclose significant and harmful confidences. The narrow view 
would not allocate such critical authority but would permit lawyers 
to decide matters that are more "means" than "objectives,"251 even 
though they normally invite client participation, e.g., whether to 
demand a jury or whom to name as defendants. 
Although this narrow version of de facto authority may cause 
lawyer-influenced rather than client-influenced results, which may 
mean "wrong" results, the very real need to develop workable 
means of representing incompetent clients requires the conclusion 
that, on balance, such behavior should not be deemed 
unacceptable.252 
The broader version of de facto guardianship that the Model 
Rules contemplate raises more serious problems that are harder to 
justify even after balancing the practical needs of working lawyers. 
Although there is a preliminary concern about the lack of any sub-
stantive source of authority to bind the client vis-a-vis third par-
Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REV. 639 (1981) (self-regulation is 
anticompetitive behavior); Martyn, supra note 1, at 308-09 (legal profession does little to 
exclude incompetent lawyers); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibil-
ity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977) (anticompetitive effects of conflicts of interest, unauthorized 
practice, and solicitation provisions of Model Code); Rhode, Policing the Professional Mo-
nopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981). 
251. The distinction between ends and means is relied on by the Model Rules. See 
MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.2(a) & comment 11 1. 
252. Acceptance of the narrow version of da facto authority results from balancing the 
interests involved and understanding practical lawyering. Although the distinction between 
ends and means is often illusory, see Strauss, supra note 1, at 324-26, some real differences 
exist between decisions about critical junctures in the course of representation and decisions 
about the way to further objectives that the client has chosen. Ordinary informed consent 
principles require attorney-client collaboration on decisions about means as well as on deci-
sions about ends. Id. at 333-35. With impaired clients, however, it is difficult to justify the 
intrusiveness and public revelation that accompany the pursuit of proxy consent for deci-
sions that are less crucial. In such cases the lawyer may make means decisions in accordance 
with her client's prior expressed objectives. 
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ties,2113 the primary concern is the absence of accountability and 
restraint. The purpose of informed consent is to protect client au-
tonomy, particularly against misperception of client values and 
conflicts of interest.2114 The good faith of lawyers cannot be relied 
on to protect competent clients from these possibilities. Thus, effi-
ciency cannot justify reliance on lawyer good faith to protect in-
competent clients unless no other choices exist. The broad view of 
de facto authority, therefore, sacrifices the client's substantial au-
tonomy interests without imposing side constraints on lawyer bias 
and conflict of interest.21111 
The guardianship process, the family-as-proxy method, and 
the client consent option each, to a greater or lesser degree, impose 
such side constraints. Even if a lawyer who pursues guardianship 
always gets it,2116 and even if an appointed guardian is apt to follow 
the lawyer's lead,2117 the process of obtaining proxy consent and the 
process of articulating decisionmaking criteria will serve to restrain 
lawyer conflicts of interest.2l1s Such side constraints and accounta-
bility are important not merely because of conflicts of interest but 
253. See Devine, supra note 133, at 513-14 (lawyer loses all authority to act when 
client becomes disabled). 
254. One of the significant purposes underlying informed consent is to establish both 
procedural and substantive rights that counteract lawyer bias and self-interest. Cf. Spiegel, 
supra note 1, at 76-77 (discussing conflicts of interest). Not only does the lawyer seldom 
appreciate her client's values fully but her position is fraught with potential conflicts of 
interest. For example, the vast majority of legal disputes are resolved by negotiated settle-
ment. See G. WILLIAMS. LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETI'LEMENT (1983); Menkel-Meadow, 
supra note 116, at 768 & n.53. The terms of a settlement as well as the decision not to 
litigate are choices made formally by the lawyer. The impact of such decisions on the law-
yer's income, schedule, prestige, and stress is usually substantial; in fact, it is precisely for 
this reason that informed consent regarding such major decisions is critical. 
255. See Luban, supra note 29, at 465. 
256. Lawyers seeking guardianship are overwhelmingly likely to succeed not only be-
cause guardianship petitions tend to be granted generally, see Horstman, Protective Ser-
vices for the Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REV. 215, 235-36 (1975); 
Mitchell, Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents: A Strategy for Legal Services Advo-
cates, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 451, 454 (1978), but also because the lawyer's support for the 
guardianship, if known to the judge, would carry immeasurable weight. 
257. A guardian is likely to follow the lawyer's advice for two reasons. First, client-
centeredness is less likely when the "client" is a proxy even if the attorney believes in the 
doctrine and acts in good faith. Because both the attorney and the proxy are each bound by 
the hypothetical substituted judgment of the incompetent and not by any existing subjec-
tive feelings, their decisionmaking is apt to be rather mechanical, tending toward an objec-
tive or "reasonable person" approach. See Buchanan, supra note 236, at 402-03. In such a 
process the lawyer's perceptions and analysis are likely to playa significant role. Second, the 
guardian, having no personal stake in the outcome of the case, is more likely to delegate 
decisionmaking, expressly or implicitly, to the lawyer. 
258. See Spiegel, supra note 1, at 118-23. 
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also because of the tendency, especially of lawyers,259 to be pater-
nalistic in dealing with less "capable" persons.260 De facto guardi-
anship thus creates difficulty not only because it fails to provide 
any substantive authority for the lawyer's agency or any constraint 
on conflicts of interest, but also because it encourages lawyer 
paternalism. 
It must be conceded that denying attorneys the authority to 
act as de facto guardians makes their life more difficult. But that is 
not necessarily bad. Considering that guardianship should remain 
a seldom used option, both because of the ethical and practical 
problems associated with it, denial of the de facto guardian alter-
native will force lawyers to make genuine efforts to discern the rea-
sons for their clients' choices,261 and to involve family members if 
the difficulties persist. Each of these is a potentially welcome de-
velopment, for they are both more likely to lead to client-based 
decisions than would repeated lawyer usurpation of decisionmak-
ing authority. In addition, denying such authority does not mean 
that lawyers will not intervene in this manner when warranted by 
sufficiently critical circumstances. A lawyer will probably act, not-
withstanding a general rule denying de facto authority, if her client 
would otherwise suffer irreparable harm. She will take the risk if 
she believes she is justified. If the lawyer is in fact justified, she 
will likely suffer no discipline for this civil disobedience. Thus, the 
profession's refusal to permit intervention ex ante will cause law-
yers to act as de facto guardians only in the most compelling 
circumstances.262 
The concept of genuinely exploring the reasons for client 
choices leads us to the last of the options to be assessed. The fol-
lowing section considers how a lawyer employing the dyadic dia-
logue might achieve more client-centered results, and how that 
process might also lead to manipulation and coercion. 
259. See Wasserstrom, supra note 29, at 16-19. 
260. See Wikler, supra note 164, at 378-79; see also supra note 71. 
261. See J. KATZ, supra note 56, at 163 (the concept of "fraternal correction"); T. 
SHAFFER, supra note 31, at 254-69 (various forms of "interventions" with which to confront 
clients). 
262. This suggestion is based on Robert Burt's work on physician and court interven-
tion on behalf of the medically ill. See R. BURT, supra note 4, at 135-43. 
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E. The Dialogue: Persuasion, Manipulation, and "Fraternal 
Correction" 
We now turn to Binder and Price's suggestion263 that a lawyer 
whose client makes an extremely detrimental choice may attempt 
to persuade the client to choose a more beneficial option. As 
pointed out above/64 a lawyer should ordinarily refrain from ex-
pressing an opinion regarding the relative merit of any choice 
available to the client. To guide the client's decision by doing so is 
inconsistent with the policy of informed consent because clients 
are unlikely to resist lawyer influence, which results in lawyer-cen-
tered rather than client-centered decisions. Although perhaps not 
exactly a breach of ethics,265 such a practice is tactically 
inappropriate. 
To recommend this normally inappropriate practice for ques-
tionably competent clients seems a bit incongruous at first ghince. 
If a lawyer's influence is too strong for healthy, competent clients, 
it appears senseless to argue that more confused clients can better 
withstand it. This proposition, however, should not be so easily 
dismissed. There are several reasons why persuasion should not be 
ruled out as an option for lawyers whose clients make ill-consid-
ered and harmful decisions. 
Persuasion may take several forms, and its ethical propriety 
might turn on the form used. Thus, it is important to define the 
forms of persuasion that must be addressed in this discussion. For 
this purpose there are four modes of persuasion, covering the con-
tinuum from subtlety to coercion. At the subtle end is nonverbal 
behavior that either intentionally or unintentionally communicates 
the lawyer's desires or preferences.266 Next to nonverbal behavior 
are "is statements,"267 statements of fact that lead to inevitable 
263. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note I, at 203-10. 
264. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text. 
265. No professional responsibility standards currently in operation, ethics committee 
opinions, or judicial opinions have ever held expressly or implicitly that persuasion of clients 
is ethically improper. But given the general ethical requirement of informed consent and the 
fact that persuasion is a poor method of implementing informed consent, the use of persua-
sion raises serious ethical questions. Ct. Wasserstrom, supra note 29, at 19 (professional 
interaction is often manipulative and paternalistic). But see Jones v. Barnes, 473 U.S. 745, 
761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting propriety of persuading client to follow law-
yer's advice). 
266. Ct. Note, The Appearance ot Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in 
Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1985) (judges' influence on juries through nonver-
bal cues). 
267. The "is-ought" dichotomy is from Zimmerman, The Is-Ought Barrier: An Un-
necessary Dualism, 71 MIND 53 (1962), discussed in J. SMART, ETHICS, PERSUASION & TRUTH 
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conclusions. Further along the continuum are "ought state-
ments,"268 suggesting or commanding certain choices. Finally, at 
the coercive end of the spectrum are outright threats, imposed not 
by inevitable facts but by the lawyer using perhaps all the other 
three forms of persuasion.269 Each of these methods might be em-
ployed by lawyers to prod clients into acting as lawyers believe 
they should.270 
These forms of persuasion must be assessed not in the general 
context of competent clients271 but in the limited context of ques-
tionably rational clients. Some preliminary assumptions are neces-
sary. First, as a broad generalization, persuasion itself and the 
above methods of persuasion, except for threats, are not ethically 
troublesome.272 Lawyers are supposed to persuade others.273 Sec-
ond, assume, at least arguendo, that persuading clients is trouble-
some.274 In light of these two assumptions then, we must determine 
45-63 (1984). Zimmerman's article seeks to demonstrate the uselessness of moral language or 
"ought" statements (e.g., "You ought to do X.") because they add nothing to the "is" state-
ments, statements of fact or empirical prediction (e.g., "If you do X you will be rewarded.") 
on which they rest. 
268. Id. 
269. A "threat" should be distinguished from a prediction. If the lawyer points out 
that a particular strategy will bring an unfavorable result, he has not threatened that out-
come, but merely revealed it. If, on the other hand, the lawyer promises to reduce an unfa-
vorable outcome if the client refuses to adopt a recommended strategy, then her action is 
aptly termed a threat. See, e.g., Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion": Virtue Words and 
Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 571-89. 
270. For a discussion of methods of manipulation and coercion that might enter into 
the attorney-client dyad, see EHmann, Lawyers & Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. (1987). 
271. See id. EHmann addresses persuasion as applied to competent clients. In general, 
the profession has addressed the question of persuasion far less than the issue deserves. But 
see Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1031-32 
(1981). More attention and criticism have been directed to the concept of the lawyer's 
"moral neutrality" vis-a-vis her client. See, e.g., Kager & Rosen, On the Social Significance 
of Large Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 435-43 (1985); Simon, Visions of Practice 
in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984); Simon, supra note 29, at 131-44; Spiegel, 
Lawyers and Professional Autonomy: Reflections on Corporate Lawyering and the Doc-
trine of Informed Consent, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 139, 146-52 (1987). 
272. Persuasion is not moraHy opprobrious. "To point out persuasion is not to con-
demn it; the practical problem is not to avoid all persuasion, but to decide which to avoid 
and which to accept." C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE, quoted in Johannesen, Perspec-
tives on Ethics in Persuasion, in PERSUASION: RECEPTION AND RESPONSIBILITY (C. Larson ed. 
1973). 
273. Much of law training is directed to developing the skill of persuasion. See, e.g., R 
KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS, passim (2d ed. 1973); K. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRAC-
TICE SKILLS IN A NUTSHELL, passim (1978); G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 42, at 855-
956. 
274. For an argument that persuading clients is unethical, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 53-64. The limits on attorney solicitation of clients stem from concern about advo-
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whether lawyers may justifiably use persuasion with clients who 
are exhibiting "wants over values" behavior. 
This Article's thesis is that such persuasion is justified. Law-
yers ought to be permitted greater latitude to use persuasive dia-
logue with a confused client than with a more coherent client.275 
This is not an easy conclusion to draw. In fact, it may be the result 
of believing that less neutrality is needed in all lawyer-client inter-
action.276 However, given the difficulty in accepting the con-
verse-that neutrality should be maintained even in the face of ir-
rational decisions-it seems to be necessary. 
Actively challenging a client's decision may be justified on sev-
eral grounds. The first, and no doubt the weakest justification is 
that it is perverse to resort to such intrusive intervention as guard-
ianship without first having attempted to elicit client consent, par-
ticularly if the client is capable of functioning and articulating.277 
A second consideration is that the reasons for not doing this with 
competent clients do not apply to incompetent clients because pa-
ternalism has been accepted as a reasonable response to the cli-
ent's incapacity to make reasoned decisions. Each of the alterna-
tives discussed above involves paternalism. Thus, if the only 
objection to persuasion is paternalism, it is the least objectionable 
of all the available options. 
Another important reason for permitting, perhaps even en-
couraging, persuasion if a client appears to be acting self-destruc-
tively is that persuasion can help both the lawyer and the client to 
explore the reasons for the client's choice. The type of persuasion 
that can achieve such a result is a dialogue that employs "is" state-
ments to test the client's logic. Professor Jay Katz compares this 
cacy skills being used against defenseless lay persons. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978); Figa, Lawyer Solicitation Today 
and Under the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 393, 407 
(1981); Note, Protection for Attorney Solicitation Slow in Coming, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 698, 
718-19 (1981). 
275. This Article's thesis is not that confused clients ought to receive relatively greater 
lawyer involvement as a rule. Rather, only if we posit that nonimpaired clients receive neu-
tral treatment will the recommended involvement with less impaired clients be greater. 
276. The discussion of the use of persuasion, particularly that which is grounded in 
Jay Katz's and Robert Burt's notions of mutually interdependent decisionmaking, see infra 
notes 278-80, might well apply to ordinary attorney-client interactions. See authorities cited 
supra note 271. 
277. All of the suggestions found in this section perforce apply only to functioning 
clients. In cases involving severely impaired and noncommunicative clients, seeking to ob-
tain consent is obviously not an alternative. 
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method to Thomas Aquinas' concept of "fraternal correction"278 
because it captures the same spirit of mutual, interactive decision-
making. This is more helpful than viewing "client choice" or "law-
yer choice" as isolated parts of a dialectic process.279 For example, 
the lawyer says "I cannot follow your instructions unless I fully 
understand them, so I need you to explain all your reasons, even 
unconscious reasons,280 for your decision." Actively exploring the 
client's reasons may have two beneficial effects: the client may 
learn that his decision is inconsistent with his values; or the lawyer 
may learn that the client has arrived at an apparently "insane" 
decision by means of a rational process. If, on the other hand, the 
lawyer is convinced that the client is not using a rational decision-
making process, the lawyer's efforts at persuasion will have tested 
the client's competence more fully.281 At the very least, this should 
be attempted before abandoning the client for resort to a proxy. 
There are formidable conceptual objections, however, to the 
"fraternal correction" form of persuasion. The first recalls the ini-
tial objection to non-neutrality: that clients will be influenced by 
lawyers. If this is correct, this form of persuasion is no different in 
result from the de facto guardian alternative that has been re-
jected. This objection is no doubt partially true, and therefore adds 
to the difficulty of assessing the available options. There are signif-
icant differences, however, between persuasion and de facto guard-
ianship. The most critical distinction is that persuasion rests on 
278. J. KATZ, supra note 56, at 163 (quoting T. AQUINAS, II SUMMA THEOLOGlCA, Q. 33, 
1333-41 (Benziger trans. 1947». 
279. [d. See R. BURT, supra note 4, passim. 
280. The lawyer might even be encouraged to seek a mental health professional's assis-
tance in understanding the reasons for her client's actions. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9, 
Rule 1.14, comment 11 5 (lawyer may seek guidance from appropriate diagnostician). This 
suggestion raises additional ethical issues. 
First, consultation with a professional must either be prefaced by full and knowing cli-
ent consent or accomplished without revealing client confidences. Because consent might 
not be forthcoming in most cases, the diagnosis will be based on reviewing screened records 
and talking with the attorney rather than on a face-to-face evaluation of the client. Such a 
diagnosis may not be very useful. 
Second, a more serious question is whether the kinds of probing dialogue that Jay Katz 
describes in his book, see supra note 56, can be performed as effectively by one who is not 
trained in interpersonal dynamics. Although this inquiry is obviously central to this counsel-
ing issue, it is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally A. WATSON, supra note 65, at 
122-26; A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS (rev. ed. 1978) (lawyers need to understand 
psychology). 
281. One risk of testing the client's competence by challenging his decisions is that 
this process tends to equate competence with the ability to verbalize thoughts and impres-
sions. It is therefore biased against the less verbally skilled. See Stanley, supra note 67, at 
61. 
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client choice, and openly recognizes the client as the ultimate deci-
sionmaker; de facto guardianship clearly does not. To the extent 
that persuasion does not become coercion,282 the distinction is a 
valid one. Persuasion protects client autonomy far better than ei-
ther formal or de facto guardianship.283 Futhermore, its continuing 
requirement of client consent provides the side constraints that de 
facto guardianship lacks. Persuasion is therefore preferable, in 
terms of client autonomy, to the alternatives. 
The second objection questions the logic of disparate treat-
ment for competent and questionably competent clients. There are 
two responses to this objection. First, as explained above, paternal-
ism is justified with incompetent clients, even though it is not jus-
tified with competent clients.284 For instance, if Mr. H explained 
that he was willing to risk losing his house because he hated litiga-
tion, his lawyer would not be justified in trying to persuade him 
that his value system was wrong.285 The second response to this 
objection is the untested empirical observation that clients whose 
reasoning processes are such that intervention is justified are less 
likely to respond to lawyer influence by changing their decisions.286 
If this is true, the risk of a lawyer imposing her values on an in-
competent client is less than it would be in normal attorney-client 
interactions. 
The final objection to persuasion by "fraternal correction" is 
that the use of such persuasion is tautological. This type of persua-
sion is similar to that employed by doctors but rejected by courts: 
282. Of course, persuasion may be used to overcome the free choice of the audience. 
See Johannesen, supra note 272, at 216. Such overbearance is not sanctioned by this Arti-
cle's recommendations. Some semblance of voluntariness must accompany any change in 
attitude accomplished by legitimate persuasion. 
283. In fact, some argue that persuasion is a necessary element in supporting auton-
omy. "To argue with a person and seek to persuade him or her is to respect the person's 
autonomy." Thompson, supra note 55,.at 111 n.84. 
284. But see Baron, On Knowing One's Chains and Decking Them With Flowers: 
Limits on Patient Autonomy in "The Silent World of Doctor and Patient," 9 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 313, 32 (1987) (the premise that ill reasoning permits intervention "offer[s] us psy-
chiatric paternalism for medical paternalism"). 
285. See Luban, supra note 29, at 489. 
286. The conclusion that incompetent clients are less likely to be influenced by their 
lawyers is based on the author's observations during several years of representing failing 
elderly clients and mentally ill younger clients. This conclusion also has some logical appeal, 
if only because those clients who are considered "difficult" are those who do not respond as 
expected to a given set of data. This does not rule out the possibility, however, of less com-
petent clients who are susceptible to lawyer influence. To the extent that a client will 
change his mind merely because his lawyer requests it, his consent is not informed and 
cannot serve as the basis for his attorney's actions. 
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if the client persists in an irrational choice, he will be treated as 
incompetent; but if his lawyer can persuade him to agree to a more 
rational course, then his consent will be treated as valid.287 This is 
a difficult objection to answer. One response is that persuasion 
simply cannot be used with clients who cannot comprehend the 
dialogue and who, therefore, cannot give consent.288 The distinc-
tion between persuasion and coercion is critical; with such severely 
impaired clients, the lawyer must seek another form of interven-
tion because persuasion would amount to coercion. With less pro-
foundly impaired clients, however, the process of persuasion can be 
a test of competence, as explained above. If the client's response to 
the lawyer's arguments is continued reliance on delusions, with no 
appreciation of the actual facts and circumstances, then the lawyer 
can appropriately determine that competence is in question.289 
Thus, the process is not necessarily as tautological as it appears at 
first. Indeed, one competence testing study points out that the "va-
lence" of the decision, i.e., whether the person is refusing or ac-
cepting treatment,290 may be a legitimate factor in determining 
competence. Ultimately, the level of tautology will turn on the 
quality of the lawyer-client interaction. The lawyer must decide in 
the end whether she has simply wheedled an involuntary "yes" 
from her client. Although reliance on lawyer good faith is not suffi-
cient in these cases,291 good faith must nevertheless be required.292 
Even if "fraternal correction" is justified, does permissible 
persuasion include telling the client what he should do? If persua-
sive "is" statements ("You will lose your· home if you do not ask a 
judge for help, and you have always told me that you do not want 
to lose your house") are appropriate, but persuasive threats ("You 
will agree to file a lawsuit· or I will have you placed in a nursing 
287. See supra note 92. 
288. Advocating the use of persuasion assumes a certain level of functioning and abil-
ity to process persuasion. Absent that, persuasion becomes coercive manipulation. 
289. See authorities cited supra note 95. 
290. Roth, Meisel & Lidz, supra note 88, at 282-83. The authors report that when the 
risklbenefit ratio of an action is favorable but the patient refuses to consent, a test employ-
ing a higher threshold of competency may be applied. 
291. See supra text accompanying notes 255-64. 
292. Any guidance on an issue such as the one addressed by this Article must recog-
nize that lawyers seek in good faith to consider ex ante how economic, social, and psycholog-
ical pressure might impair their future good faith. This initial good faith is an essential 
element of the approach advocated in this Article, an approach that rejects sole reliance on 
good faith. And finally, although a breach of duty may lead to suit for damages, see Maute, 
supra note 1, at 1087-89, attorney conduct is regulated largely by the honor system. 
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home"} are not,293 then the question is whether "ought" state-
ments ("You really should file that lawsuit") are more like "is" 
statements or threats. J.C.C. Smart has pointed out that although 
"ought" statements may be used to save time by summarizing in-
numerable "is" statements,294 most often they are used to avoid 
logic and persuade by power, authority, or coercion.295 If this is 
true, then using "ought" statements after logical arguments have 
failed must be rejected as a form of coercion. If it succeeds after 
logic has failed, it is only because of the lawyer's influence. That 
kind of manipulation, although efficient, is unjustified. 
In the end, persuasion might not work. If the client lacks deci-
sionmaking capacity, it should not work. In such cases, an attorney 
must fall back on other options and determine whether the circum-
stances warrant imposing a guardian, relying on the family, or sim-
ply accepting the client's wishes. 
V. CAVEATS, APOLOGIES, AND A CONCLUSION 
This is all very risky business. Any acceptance of lawyer inter-
vention, any authorization for deviating from strict informed con-
sent and presumed competence, potentially opens "the floodgates" 
for more lawyer control and less client autonomy. A lot of line-
drawing is called for and history shows that professionals tend to 
draw lines in ways that benefit themselves.296 The benefits offered 
by prophylactic rules are notable: if lawyers are forbidden from 
questioning client competence they can have little temptation to 
intervene inappropriately. Permitting lawyer discretion cannot 
avoid the consequence of encouraging more paternalism.297 
With all this firmly in mind, some intervention must be reluc-
tantly advocated or accepted. The profession cannot refuse to as-
sist those who are incapable of helping themselves in the name of 
protecting the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers 
293. See EHmann, supra, note 270. 
294. J. SMART, supra note 267, at 54. 
295. [d. at 62-63. 
296. See Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functionai Perspective on Professional 
Codes, 59 TEx. L. REV. 689 (1981); authorities cited supra note 250. 
297. The encouragement of paternalism is truly a significant consideration. The great 
difficulty in developing procedures to guide lawyers in their dealings with disabled clients is 
that lawyers, like other professionals, tend to be paternalistic. Thus, procedures that allow 
some paternalism may produce greater intervention than anticipated. See Wasserstrom, 
supra note 29; Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education, in THE GOOD LAW-
YER 317, 329 (D. Luban ed. 1983) ("the internalization of predominantly persuasion-mode 
habits can cause a person to interpret most social relationships in persuasion-mode terms"). 
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and the ethical rules that govern them, however, must acknowledge 
and counteract their natural attraction to dominance and manipu-
lation. The trick is to assist clients while restraining lawyers.298 It 
is not an easy balance to strike. 
This Article is an attempt-perhaps an initial and tentative 
attempt-to adjust that balance. By suggesting that pursuing 
guardianship is legitimate in extreme cases, that reliance on family 
may .be appropriate, that noncoercive persuasion is justified in less 
extreme cases, and that unilateral usurpation of client autonomy is 
never appropriate except in emergencies, this Article offers some 
concrete standards for guiding lawyer behavior. Much more discus-
sion, however, is necessary. These issues are too important to 
ignore. 
298. When an earlier draft of this Article was presented at the UCLAlWarwick Inter-
national Clinical Conference in October 1986, some participants questioned whether re-
straining lawyers actually was "the trick." They believe that the current crop of law stu-
dents, for example, is notably unwilling to intervene actively in client affairs. If it were true 
that lawyers needed encouragement rather than discouragement in their interventionism, 
the conclusions drawn in this Article would be different. This author's belief is that lawyer 
domination of client decisionmaking is the rule, not the exception. Professional domination 
of client and patient is a consistent theme in studies of professional behavior. Notwithstand-
ing the evidence of instrumentalist attitudes in cases of moral disagreement with client 
goals, the real problem is still the prevalence of lawyer-oriented, rather than client-oriented, 
lawyering. 
